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RETHINKING THE HOMEOWNERSHIP
SOCIETY: RENTAL STABILITY
ALTERNATIVE
By Arlo Chase*
INTRODUCTION
For more than 85 years, the United States government has
promoted homeownership through mortgage programs, tax
subsidies and popular rhetoric. The exhortations of
homeownership became even more pronounced throughout the
1990s and this decade. President George W. Bush’s campaign
for the “Ownership Society”1 represented the culmination of this
*Associate Adjunct Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; Senior
Vice President for Policy Initiatives, New York State Housing Finance
Agency/State of New York Mortgage Agency. The opinions expressed herein
are mine alone and do not represent those of my employers. I would like to
thank the following people for their helpful comments and suggestions:
Susanna Kohn, Oscar Chase, David Reiss, Christopher Serkin, Lee Ann
Fennell, Robert Ellickson, Martin Kohn and Vicki Been. I would also like to
thank the staff of The Journal of Law and Policy for their helpful editing.
Moira Skeados provided able and much appreciated research assistance.
1
See, e.g., Robert J. Schiller, American Casino, ATLANTIC, Mar. 2005,
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200503/shiller (detailing former
President George W. Bush’s proposed “ownership society,” which planned to
let people “own” their Social Security contributions, in the form of personal
retirement accounts; “own” their health care, through portable health savings
accounts; and own their homes in greater numbers, through bigger
homeowner subsidies, noting that such proposals would encourage individual
saving, but also increase the risk to which most American households would
be subject); see also Greg Ip et al., Housing Bust Fuels Blame Game, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 27, 2008 (quoting President George W. Bush as stating, as part
of the “ownership society” that, “we want everybody in America to own
their own home”).
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push for homeownership. While there are arguments to be made
in favor of facilitating homeownership for qualified households,
in recent decades such promotion went beyond qualified
households and thereby helped fuel a housing bubble that
ultimately burst, resulting in a severe economic recession and
the foreclosure of millions of households. For the past 30 years,
government programs and resources have largely ignored the
other dominant tenure form—renting.2 This neglect of rental
housing and rental households has helped create a troubling
situation in which nearly half of all rental households spend
more than the government recommends on housing,3 putting
such households at risk of having insufficient resources for other
necessities like food, medical care, transportation and education.
The current housing crisis offers a historical opportunity to
assess our national and local housing policies.4 In sum, the
continued focus on homeownership, to the exclusion of renting,
is in need of immediate revision. A policy shift is in order—
government needs to direct immediate attention and increased
resources to rental housing. Such a shift would belatedly
acknowledge the fact that, notwithstanding the last eight decades

2

See, e.g., Clean Benson, Building a Better Public Housing Policy,
CONG. Q. (July 17, 2009) available at http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.
cfm?parm1=1&docID=news-000003168984 at 1–2 (quoting Bruce Katz,
stating that for the past eight years “[w]e had a really imbalanced housing
policy, not just in the private sector, but in the public sector, toward
homeownership”); see also Ip et al. supra note 1 (quoting Richard Styron,
former CEO of Freddie Mac stating “[w]e went crazy as a country with the
goals, saying everybody’s got to have a house”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
3
See infra Section IV.AB.
4
See, e.g., Robert J. Shiller, A Time for Bold Thinking on Housing,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, at 4 (arguing that the current housing price
downturn indicates a need for innovation in housing, including better
management of risk); Press Release, Nat’l Found. for Credit Counseling,
Survey Reveals Long-Term Implications of Mortgage Meltdown (June 23,
2009), available at http://www.nfcc.org/NewsRoom/newsreleases/files09/
HomeownershipSurvey.pdf (finding that popular attitudes about benefits of
homeownership have changed dramatically in the wake of the foreclosure
crisis).
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and hundreds of billions of dollars encouraging and subsidizing
homeownership, almost one third of the households in the U.S.
currently rent, and at least 95% of all Americans rent at some
point in their lives.5 Specifically, additional resources and
programs are needed which promote opportunities for increased
rental stability and affordability. The need for these changes is
evidenced by (i) the excess demand for rental housing compared
with supply which has resulted in the affordability crisis for so
many rental households;6 and (ii) the number of households that
have overstretched their budgets in order to buy homes they
could not afford, often because the rental options available to
them were simply not stable and/or affordable enough.7
To address this increasingly untenable situation, I propose a
rental stability program that would offer tenants an option for
longer lease terms, rights to lease renewal, temporary regulation
of rent increases, and federal rental subsidies to cover rent
increases for rent-burdened low and moderate income
households.8 My proposal is essentially a modest one that
provides renters with additional opportunities for stable tenancy
and time limited price protection, while maintaining marketbased incentives for owners to create new rental housing units
and maintain existing ones.
A brief review of our current national housing policy—
provided in Part I of this article—will set the stage for the
reforms urged herein. I rely on existing literature for both Part I
and Part II, in which I examine the extraordinary societal

5

See Bruce Katz & Margery Austin Turner, Rethinking U.S. Rental
Housing Policy, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, 2007 http://www.brookings.edu/
papers/2007/0228metropolitanpolicy_katz_Opp08.aspx; see also WILLIAM
APGAR, RETHINKING RENTAL HOUSING: EXPANDING THE ABILITY OF RENTAL
HOUSING TO SERVE AS A PATHWAY TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL OPPORTUNITY
1 (Dec. 2004) http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/w04-11.pdf
[hereinafter “Apgar 2004”].
6
See infra Section IV.A.
7
See infra Section IV.B.
8
See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV
1047, 1059 (2008) (“Longer and better leaseholds and reform of
homeownership’s tax advantages are worthy goals . . . .”).
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benefits afforded to promote homeownership and the reasons
typically given for them. I discuss several poignant studies that
raise serious concerns about the degree to which U.S. policies
promoting homeownership actually serve the stated goals of
household and neighborhood stability. Currently, it must be
acknowledged, the immensity of the homeownership subsidies
provided is matched only by the immensity of the devastation
wrought on individual households and surrounding communities
by the current foreclosure crisis. In Part II, I integrate the
findings of several housing studies to argue that the goals
underlying the homeownership push can be met equally by
enhanced rental stability.
In Part III, I briefly review the enormously destabilizing
effects of the foreclosure crisis on both individuals and
communities. This leads into what I consider to be my real
contribution to the existing literature: Part IV in which I lay out
the factual case for expending more government resources and
creating new legal protections for renters. Part V details the
components of my proposed rental stability program and a
discussion of how it serves my goal. That goal is to create
increased opportunities for renters to obtain some meaningful
measure of security in their tenure while avoiding excessive
distortions in the rental market. I also evaluate the likely effects
of my proposed program and respond to some likely critiques.
Finally, in Part VI I examine three distinct recent policy
proposals to addressing the housing crisis.
I. U.S. HOUSING POLICY IS SKEWED TO HOMEOWNERSHIP
A. History
Since the Great Depression, our national housing policy has
been primarily aimed at increasing homeownership.9 These

9

See, e.g., Anthony Downs, Why Rental Housing Is the Neglected Child
of American Shelter in RETHINKING RENTAL HOUSING 78 (2008) [hereinafter
Downs, Why]; see also ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES 48 (2006); Rachel D. Godsil & David V. Simunovich,
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efforts included the development of the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) and U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA) homeownership loan programs, which guarantee up to
90% of the value of a home as collateral for loans from private
banks.10 Another Depression Era creation, the Federal National
Mortgage Association, more commonly known as Fannie Mae,
began in 1968 to offer similar mortgage guarantees to a broader
cross section of Americans.11 In 1990 the Federal Home
Mortgage Corporation, otherwise known as Freddie Mac, began
to offer similar products as those of Fannie Mae.12 Given their
hybrid status as government created but privately owned
corporations, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are known
collectively as Government Sponsored Enterprises, or GSEs.13
Perhaps more important than the mortgage insurance offered
by FHA, VA and the GSEs, these entities introduced and
standardized many aspects of the mortgage industry that we now
take for granted, such as the 30 year self-amortizing mortgage,
the standardized appraisal process and the reduction of the
downpayment required to 10% or lower.14 These advances,
combined with significant economic growth in the post WWII

Protecting Status: The Mortgage Crisis, Eminent Domain and the Ethic of
Homeownership, 77 FORDHAM L. REV 949, 956–57 (2008) (“[The] high rate
of homeownership is largely a product of the federal government’s
decision . . . to subsidize homeownership for the middle class.”).
10
See SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 50; Godsil & Simunovich, supra note
9, at 957–58.
11
See David Reiss, The Federal Government’s Implied Guarantee of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the
Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1030 (2008).
12
See id. at 1029 (“[Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s] purchasing
practices have since converged.”).
13
See Reiss, supra note 11, at n.22 (“The term GSE refers to a federally
chartered, privately owned, privately managed financial institution that has
only specialized lending and guarantee powers and that bond market investors
perceive as implicitly backed by the federal government.”) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).
14
See SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 5051; see also KENNETH JACKSON,
CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES
20318 (1987).
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years, were extremely successful in increasing homeownership
in this country. Between 1940 and 1970, the percentage of
American homeowners increased from 44% to 65% of all
households.15 Between 1970 and 1990 that rate stayed
substantially the same, but then increased to over 67% by 2000
and 69% at the end of 2004.16 With the foreclosure crisis
beginning in 2006, the homeownership rate has been contracting
from the previous highs and by the middle of 2009 was at
67.4%.17 The reduction from 69% to 67.4% of all households
may sounds small, but it represents over two million
households.18 Notably, this represents the first significant decline
in homeownership since the 1930’s.19
B. Homeownership Subsidies
In addition to the federal mortgage programs discussed
above, which are aimed at increasing the availability of home
financing, federal and state governments provide a number of
other direct and indirect financial benefits to homeowners. Most
significantly, homeowners are entitled to deduct from the income
on which they have to pay income taxes both the amount they
15

Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 9, at 957 n.22.
Gale et al., Encouraging Homeownership Through the Tax Code, 115
TAX NOTES 1171 (2007).
17
See U.S. Census Bureau News, Census Bureau Reports on Residential
Vacancies and homeownership, July 24, 2009, at 4, http://www.census.gov/
hhes/www/housing/hvs/qtr209/filesq209press.pdf; see also Kathleen M.
Howley, U.S. Home Vacancies Hit 18.7 Million on Bank Seizures,
BLOOMBERG.COM, July 24, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid
+20601206&sid=ajlP7ROLo39w (describing that the homeownership rate
had dropped to 67.3%); John Leland, Homeownership Losses are Greatest
Among Minorities, Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/13/us/13homeowner.html.
18
See US Census Bureau Web Page, America’s Families and Living
Arrangements: 2008: Table H1—Households by Type and Tenure of
Householder for Selected Characteristics: 2008, Feb. 25, 2009,
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2008.html
(estimating total number of American households).
19
See SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 14 fig. 2.2.
16
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pay in real property taxes20 and interest paid on a mortgage
secured by a personal residence.21 The mortgage interest
deduction includes second homes in addition to primary
residences, with an overall limit for each taxpayer of mortgages
totaling up to $1 million.22 Other tax benefits include the fact
that imputed rental income is not considered income for tax
purposes and therefore is not taxed.23 Furthermore, in 1996 the
tax code was amended at the initiation of the Clinton
Administration so that homeowners selling their primary
residence could exclude the first $250,000 of gain ($500,000 for
married couples) from their reported income.24 Acknowledging
all of these benefits to homeowners, two law professors
conclude that “[h]omeowners are afforded both significant
monetary benefits and social capital that renters are denied.”25
Scholars have identified a number of problems with the
mortgage interest deduction and other federal tax benefits
provided to homeowners. First, the current subsidies accrue
disproportionately to households in higher income brackets.26

20

26 U.S.C. § 164(a) (2009).
26 U.S.C. §§ 163(h), 164 (2000).
22
See id.
23
Imputed rent is a tax concept that refers to the amount of rental
income that the housing unit would generate if it were rented out. Imputed
rent is taxed in a number of countries, such as Italy, Norway, and Denmark.
See Fennell, supra note 8, at 1058 n.42 (citing sources); see also James R.
Follain & Lisa Sturman Melamed, The False Messiah of Tax Policy: What
Elimination of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction Promises and a Careful
Look at What it Delivers, 9 J. HOUSING RES. 179 (1998) (discussing
importance of nontaxation of imputed rent).
24
26 U.S.C. § 121. This tax advantage can be claimed only once every
two years, and certain limited conditions must be met regarding the
ownership and use of the home. See Vikas Bajaj & David Leonhardt, Tax
Break May Have Helped Cause Housing Bubble, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2008
(describing how this tax advantage coincided, and may have helped cause the
incredible run up in housing prices from 1997–2006).
25
Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 9, at 953.
26
See, e.g., Gale et al., supra note 16, at 9 (describing the deduction as
“upside down”); SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 72–76; Downs, Why, supra
note 9, at 910.
21
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Deductions increase in value as a household’s taxable income
increases, so that higher-income taxpayers in the 28 percent
marginal tax bracket save 28 cents for every dollar of mortgage
interest deduction, and lower income taxpayers in the 15 percent
marginal tax bracket saves 15 cents for every dollar of mortgage
interest deduction. As a result, in 2005 wealthy households
(earning more than $200,000 per year) took more than eight
times as much mortgage interest deduction than middle class
households (earning between $50-75,000).27 Also, more
significantly, homeowners who do not itemize their taxes do not
benefit at all from the mortgage interest and real property tax
deductions. Because many choose to take the standard deduction,
only half of all homeowners benefit from these crucial
government subsidies.28 Furthermore, other borrowers (such as
credit card borrowers) are not entitled to deduct interest
expenditures at all.29
The total annual cost to the federal government, in terms of
tax expenditures and indirect subsidies of the GSEs, is in the
$150 to $200 billion range annually. Even without the benefits
provided through the GSEs and FHA and VA, which are
difficult to quantify,30 the tax revenue lost annually to

27

See Gale et al., supra note 16, at 910.
See Roger Lowenstein, Tax Break: Who Needs the Mortgage Interest
Deduction, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006.
29
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated the deductibility of other
kinds of interest payments, including credit cards, pushing more homeowners
into increasing their mortgages. See Lowenstein, supra note 28.
30
The actual subsidy to the GSEs prior to 2008 was difficult to quantify
because most of the subsidy was the implicit federal guarantee of the GSEs’
obligations, which in turn allowed them to access capital at a cheaper cost.
Compare Gale et al., supra note 16, at 1777 (noting that to the extent it can
be quantified, the Congressional Budget Office estimated subsidy to GSEs at
$23 billion in 2003) with Reiss, supra note 11, at 104849 (noting that a
Federal Reserve researcher “has estimated that the present value of the
federal government’s subsidy of Fannie and Freddie is nearly $150
billion . . .”). In September 2008, the US Treasury Department announced
that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were in danger of falling into insolvency
and would be placed into conservatorship, governed by the newly created
Federal Housing Finance Agency. See James R. Hagerty et al., U.S. Seizes
28
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homeownership benefits was in excess of $155 billion for
2006,31 over $125 billion for 2007 and approximately $230
billion in 2009.32 It is far from clear how we as a society benefit
from these subsidies. Many economists believe that the tax
benefits simply push up the price of homes and do not increase
the levels of homeownership.33 Professor Schwartz of the New
School notes that homeownership rates in the United State are
comparable to those in Canada, Australia and several European
countries, despite the fact that none of those countries subsidize
homeownership nearly as much as the U.S.34 Most notably, none
of those countries provide for the deductibility of mortgage
interest or property taxes. In addition to having a dubious impact
on the rate of homeownership, the tax incentives encourage

Mortgage Giants, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2008, at A1. While the Treasury
initially pledged $100 billion, it was quickly raised to $200 billion to cover
the losses of Fannie and Freddie. As of the date of this article that amount
has been increased to $400 billion [on source], with close to $85 billion
already distributed. See Chris Isidore, Fannie & Freddie: The Most Expensive
Bailout, CNNMONEY.COM, July 22, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/07/
22/news/companies/fannie_freddie_bilout/index/htm.
31
See, e.g., Gale et al., supra note 16, at 1174. This includes
approximately $30 billion in benefits accumulated from the non-taxation of
imputed rent, as well as the deductibility of mortgage interest, property taxes
and the exclusion from capital gains of sales proceeds.
32
See Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 9, at 958 (regarding 2007). It is
unclear if this calculation includes the value of the non-taxation of imputed
rent). In Housing Bust, Government Increasingly Favors Homeowners Over
Renters, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2009 (compared with $60 billion in aid to
renters for 2009).
33
See, e.g., Gale et al., supra note 16, at 1180 (“[T]ime series evidence
in the U.S. provides little reason to believe that the [mortgage interest
deduction] has a substantial influence on homeownership.”); Steven Malanga,
Obsessive Housing Disorder, CITY J., Spring 2009, at 10, available at
http://www.city-journal.org/2009/19_2_homeownership.html
(suggesting
elimination of the mortgage interest deduction); Edward Glaeser & Joseph
Gyourko, Two Ways to Revamp U.S Housing Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2008, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/16/two-ways-torevamp-us
-housing-policy/.
34
See SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 76; see also Gale et al., supra note
16, at 118183.
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homeowners to buy more expensive houses and borrow more
(up to $1 million), thereby increasing their tax deductions.
These incentives are perverse in two ways: (i) they encourage
homeowners to over-leverage their properties; and (ii) they
encourage bigger and generally speaking more energy
consumptive housing.35
The critiques of the mortgage interest deduction come from
all sides of the political spectrum, including liberal housing
scholars like William Apgar,36 more conservative housing
economists from the American Enterprise Institute37 and the
Manhattan Institute,38 economists from the Brookings Institute
and MIT39 and an economic columnist from the New York
40
Times. While the effect of eliminating the mortgage interest
deduction is debated,41 along with what should replace it, these
35

See Andre F. Shashaty, Help Us Shape the Future of Affordable
Housing Policy, AFFORDABLE HOUSING FINANCE, Mar. 2008, at 24 (quoting
Brett Harvey).
36
See Apgar 2004, supra note 5, at 5–9.
37
See EDWARD GLAESER & JOSEPH GYOURKO, RETHINKING FEDERAL
HOUSING POLICY: HOW TO MAKE HOUSING PLENTIFUL AND AFFORDABLE
(AEI Press, 2008) (proposing that the mortgage interest deduction be
substantially reduced to a cap of $300,000 in large portions of the country
that restrict housing through local zoning and land use regulations). But see
Letter from Charles McMillan, President, Nat’l Assoc. of Realtors, to
President Obama (Feb. 26, 2009) (“The National Association of
REALTORS® believe the [Mortgage Interest Deduction] is the single most
important tax provision for our nation and our families.”)
38
See Steven Malanga, Obsessive Housing Disorder, CITY J., Spring
2009 at 10.
39
See Gale et al., supra note 16.
40
See Lowenstein, supra note 28.
41
See Follain & Melamed, supra note 23, at 19596 (arguing that the
elimination of the mortgage interest deduction might not produce the
predicted effects of equalizing the tax treatment of higher and lower income
households, since higher income households might be able to finance their
home purchases through other means like cash purchases and noting that the
nontaxation of imputed rent might be more important to address than the
mortgage interest deduction). Cf. Gale et al., supra note 16, at 16–17
(arguing that eliminating the mortgage interest deduction will increase
investment in rental properties, but will also encourage owners to sink more
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critiques have made it into reform proposals. For example, in
2005 President Bush’s Bipartisan Advisory Panel on Federal Tax
Reform proposed changing the mortgage interest deduction to a
15 percent credit and making it available to all tax filers,
regardless of itemization status.42 President Obama proposed a
similar plan during his campaign.43 As with other plans to
restrict or amend the mortgage interest deduction, neither
proposal has gathered momentum in Congress. Still, other
changes have been proposed. President Obama’s fiscal year
2010–11 budget proposal advanced the idea of reducing the rate
of mortgage and other deductions available to taxpayers in the
highest tax brackets.44 This budget proposal did not pass
however, as the National Association of Realtors and other real
estate interest groups responded with their usual predictions of
disaster if such a change were enacted.45
II. WHY DO WE SPEND ALL THIS MONEY TO SUPPORT
HOMEOWNERSHIP?
In the midst of the great depression, President Franklin
Roosevelt argued that, “special safeguards should be thrown
around home ownership as a guarantee of social and economic
stability.”46 But that begs the question. Assuming for a moment
that the various homeownership subsidies outlined above actually
equity into their homes and thus may end up in increasing total investment in
housing).
42
See Lowenstein, supra note 28, at 45.
43
See Nick Timiraos, Homeownership Push is Rethought, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 12, 2008 (“Senator Obama has proposed a 10% mortgage interest tax
credit for homeowners who don’t itemize.”).
44
See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, A NEW ERA OF
RESPONSIBILITY: RENEWING AMERICA’S PROMISE 29–30 (2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/fy2010_new_era/A_New_Era_of_Res
ponsibility2.pdf.
45
See Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, NAR Opposes Mortgage
Interest Deduction Provision on Obama’s Budget Proposal, (Feb. 26, 2009),
available at http://www.realtor.org/government_affairs/mortgage_interest_
deduction/mid_obama_budget_proposal.
46
See Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 9, at 985 n.168.

CHASE REVISED.DOC

4/27/2010 7:32 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

72

do increase the rate of homeownership, there still remains the
question of why our society should spend all these resources to
privilege homeownership over renting. The main reasons
proffered for supporting homeownership are: (i) homeownership
benefits individual households; and (ii) an increase in
homeownership creates positive externalities, or positive
spillover effects that are shared by the community surrounding
the homeowner households.
A. Homeownership Benefits Individuals
We can further divide the first claim—that households benefit
from homeownership—into two basic components. The first is
that enabling households to purchase homes will benefit those
households financially.47 The financial benefit is also
multifaceted. First, by having to make mortgage payments and
thereby gaining equity, homeownership “gives households a
default mechanism for savings.”48 That increased equity, in turn,
“permits the owner to leverage capital, which can help to buy
investment properties, start a new business, send a child to
college, or save for retirement.”49 In addition to promoting
savings and enabling households increased access to capital,
homeowners enjoy a measure of price protection against housing
cost increases that enable them to better plan financially.50 Of
course the price protections are not absolute: real estate taxes,
insurance
and
homeowners
association
or
cooperative/condominium dues may increase, as may borrowing
costs of borrowers who have taken out adjustable rate or
51
payment option mortgages. But, at least compared with renters
47

But see Nat’l Found. For Credit Counseling, supra note 4 (finding that
“almost half of all American adults, more than 100 million people, no longer
believe that homeownership is a realistic way to build wealth”).
48
See Shelter or Burden? ECONOMIST, Apr. 16, 2009 (quoting Richard
Green of the University of South Carolina).
49
See Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 9, at 954.
50
See Fennell, supra note 8, at 1054–55 (discussing price protection and
caveats).
51
See id. at 1055.
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who are subject to market based rent increases on annual
intervals, most homeowners’ housing costs are more predictable.
Scholars
also
attribute
increased
stability
to
52
homeownership. This is related to price stability, of course, but
the notion is somewhat broader than just price. The argument is
that homeowners enjoy a psychic benefit resulting from their
property rights to exercise dominion over their homes, exclude
outsiders, and to remain in perpetuity (subject, of course, to the
rights of lenders and governments to foreclose for non-payment
of mortgages or taxes).53 Furthermore, as Professors Godsil &

52

While most scholars identify increased stability as a positive effect,
there is some debate. Compare Apgar 2004 at 41–42 (“[R]esidential stability
not only appears to promote community involvement and development of
beneficial social capital but also effects educational outcomes.”) with Ingrid
Ellen & Brendan O’Flaherty How New York Housing Policies Are Different—
And Maybe Why, in THE WELFARE STATE IN NEW YORK CITY (Irwin
Garfinkel and Marcia Meyers eds., Russell Sage Foundation (forthcoming
2010), at 33 (“While stability may be good for neighbors and for children,
subsidizing it can create deadweight losses. Mobility gets workers to where
they are most productive.”); see also Robert C. Ellickson, The Mediocrity of
Government Subsidies to Mixed-Income Housing Projects, 16–17 & n.28
(Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 360, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1217870 [hereinafter Ellickson, The Mediocrity]
(discussing mixed results of lock in effect resulting from rent regulation and
project based subsidies); Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 9, at
n.100 (noting negative effect on the efficiency of labor markets resulting
from housing stability; see also Sam Roberts, Slump Creates Lack of Mobility
for Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2009 (Census Bureau has found that
fewer people are moving in the recessionary economy, creating fears that jobrelated moves are getting suppressed and workers are not re-sorted to the jobs
that best use their skills). See Generally Robert C. Ellickson, Legal
Constraints on Households Moves: Should Footloose Americans Envy the
Rooted French, 6 n.8 (Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 300,
2009) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1445603 [hereinafter Ellickson,
Legal Constraints] (reviewing differences in moving patterns among countries
and discussing normative questions of which is preferable).
53
See Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 9, at 954–56 (citing
psychological benefits of homeownership); see also Gale et al., supra note
16, at 1171 (“Owning one’s home is widely viewed as an integral part of the
American Dream . . . Americans are taught from an early age to aspire to
homeownership . . . .”); Apgar 2004, supra note 5, at 56 (“Residential
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Simunovich write, once a down payment has been made and a
mortgage obtained, “the household tends to be less mobile
because the transaction costs associated with moving have been
increased. This reduced mobility . . . translates into both
commitment to place and stability for family.”54 And, for
children, “[i]n the educational arena, residential stability helps
students avoid the disruption linked to the relocation from one
school to another.”55 In sum, scholars find a number of positive
effects for households who achieve residential stability.
B. External Benefits of Homeownership
The positive community benefits associated with increased
homeownership are well summarized by Gale et al:
[m]ost importantly, homeowners may be more likely to
be active citizens working for long-term, communitywide
benefits. Homeowners may also take better care of their
houses than renters would. High rates of homeownership
may reduce crime in the area, perhaps because the
greater geographic stability of homeowners vs. renters
means that someone committing a crime would be
recognized. Any of these behaviors, if sufficiently
prevalent, could plausibly raise property values in the
community at large and hence provide a benefit to people
other than the homeowner.56
The general theory posits that the value of homes are so
dependent on the health of their surrounding community that
stability also enables parents to develop deeper and more meaningful
attachment to social support networks, and to access existing job and human
service referral networks.”).
54
Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 9, at 971–72.
55
See Apgar 2004, supra note 5, at 41 (citing Eric A. Hanushek et al.,
Disruption Versus Tiebout Improvement: The Costs and Benefits of Switching
Schools, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1721–46 (2004)).
56
See Gale et al., supra note 16, at 6; see also Fennell, supra note 8, at
1098–99, n.209 & n.213; Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 9, at 970 (“A
range of empirical studies have concluded that homeownership does in fact
have salutary benefits for households and communities . . . .”).
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homeowners have a strong self interest in improving and
maintaining their neighborhoods.57
C. The Reasons for Supporting Homeownership Argue
Equally For Enhanced Rental Stability
Many of the arguments supporting homeownership follow
from the claim that homeownership is a more stable form of
tenure than renting. But there is no reason to think that the
positive effects for individual households and surrounding
communities associated with the stability offered by
homeownership are restricted to homeownership. As Apgar
states, while “the social/psychological aspects of housing are
discussed in terms of owner-occupied housing . . . there is
nothing inherent in the concept of ‘home’ that is necessarily
linked to homeownership.”58 And there is empirical support for

57

Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 9 at 972 (“Once a homeowner has
developed a financial stake in a particular dwelling, there is a close link
between that financial stake and the well-being of the community in which the
dwelling is located.”); see WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER
HYPOTHESIS 9–12 (2001) (arguing that homeowners are so concerned about
property values that they become risk averse to a fault, making homeowners
into “NIMBYs” even when a proposed change carries a positive expected
value). There is, however, substantial debate concerning whether increased
homeownership is merely correlated with these benefits or whether it in fact
causes such outcomes. See Fennell, supra note 8, at n.213 (“Selection bias
presents a difficulty in interpreting empirical results, however—do people
with good-neighbor characteristics just happen to become homeowners, or is
there something about homeownership that improves their neighborliness.”).
Gale et al., conclude that, “while there are some compelling arguments in
theory for external benefits from homeownership, there is little evidence in
practice to support those arguments. That does not prove that the arguments
are wrong, but the burden should be on advocates of homeownership
subsidies to make the case, and that case has not yet been made in a
compelling fashion.” See Gale et al., supra note 16, at 7; see also Apgar
2004, supra note 5, at 4 (“[P]olicy makers are often less than cautious in
interpreting the existing literature [regarding benefits of homeownership].”).
58
See Apgar 2004, supra note 5, at 15; see also Ellen & O’Flaherty,
supra note 52, at 33 (“To the extent that rent control and rent subsidies mean
that tenants realize consumer surplus from their apartments in New York,
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this assertion: a much cited study from two leading housing
economists finds that much of the positive spillover effect
associated with increased homeownership in fact results from
longer term residences, and not homeownership per se.59 This
finding is supported by a research report from the National
Association of Realtors, one of the biggest proponents of
homeownership subsidies.60
The findings of this study make intuitive sense. Long-term
tenants have the same interest as owners in living in clean and
safe neighborhoods with good schools. Thus, long-term tenants
are similarly likely to be engaged in civic affairs. While it is
true that renters do not have the same profit motive as
homeowners in creating desirable living conditions, it is
they have a stake in the outcome of local political decisions, and so are more
likely to participate intelligently in the development of those policies. This
argument is usually made for homeownership [citing sources], but if it is
true, then rent control and rent subsidies provide the same sort of
advantages.”); see also id at 31 (“Both rent control and subsidies to singlefamily owners help to further population stability.”); Margaret Jane Radin,
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959 (1982) (“[T]enancy,
no less than a single-family house, is the sort of property interest in which a
person becomes self-invested; and after the self-investment has taken place,
retention of the interest becomes a priority claim over curtailment of merely
fungible interests of others.”).
59
Denise DiPasquale & Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives and Social
Capital: Are Homeowners Better Citizens?, 45 J. URB. ECON., 354–84,
(1999).
60
See Kristen David Adams, Homeownership: American Dream or
Illusion of Empowerment?, 60 S.C. L. REV. 573, 591 & n.91 (2009)
[hereinafter Adams, Homeownership] (quoting from Research Div., Nat’l
Ass’n of Realtors, Social Benefits of Homeownership and Stable Housing
(2006)),
http://www.realtor.org/research/research/homeownershipbenefits
(click “Social Benefits of Homeownership and Stable Housing” hyperlink)
(“[T]he purported benefits of homeownership may partly arise not directly
from the ownership, but from greater housing stability and social ties
associated with less frequent movements among homeowners. Therefore,
policies to boost homeownership can raise positive social outcomes, but only
to the extent that homeownership brings housing stability. Also, if it is in fact
the case that housing stability matters more than homeownership in bringing
social benefits, then the policy implication is not necessarily to promote
homeownership but to assist in residential stability.”).
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unreasonable to say the lack of such a motive would eliminate
the desire to live in good conditions for one’s family.61 Indeed,
one notable scholar, William Simon, argues that the increased
stability achieved by rent control in fact encourages more robust
long-term community involvement than homeownership because
it forces the tenant to stay in place to share the benefits of
community improvement, rather than enabling the resident to
benefit from those improvements by selling their home at a
premium.62 These studies suggest that a housing policy seeking
to strengthen residential stability should encourage longer term
stays in both owned homes and rentals. This would mean
focusing on increasing “sustainable” homeownership, as well as
increasing rental stability. This is the focus of my paper.
Now we turn briefly to measure our current level of
residential stability. In sum, the foreclosure crisis has had a
devastating impact on the stability of millions of American
households, their neighborhoods, and state and local
governments. The devastation wrought by this crisis belies the
notion that home ownership always promotes social and
economic stability.63

61

For the reasons identified above, I believe that Lawrence Summers,
the head of the President Obama’s Council of Economic Advisors is wrong to
compare renting a home to renting a car. See Conor Dougherty, In the
Exurbs, the American Dream Is Up for Rent, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2009, at
A18. (attributing to Laurence Summers the following statement: “No one in
the history of the world ever washed a rental car”). My rejoinder is that
many people wash leased cars that they have for one year, which is more
akin to rental housing than renting a car for a weekend. Renting a car for a
weekend is better analogized to renting a hotel room for a weekend, which I
would agree, rarely gets cleaned by its occupants.
62
William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV.
1335, 1360 (1991); see also Benjamin D. Barros, Home as a Legal Concept,
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 225, 290 n.147 (discussing the Simon article and
economic and moral arguments involved in rent regulation).
63
See Shelter or Burden?, ECONOMIST, Apr. 16, 2009 (“[P]erversely,
the decade of obsession with homeownership may actually have reduced
neighborhood stability.”).
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III. THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS AND RESULTING INSTABILITY
A. Foreclosure Crisis: The Statistics
It was distressing to learn recently that, despite some
stabilization in home prices,64 the increase in foreclosures has
not abated. 65 In fact, the first six months of 2009 were the worst
on record. New foreclosure filings reached over 1.5 million for
the first half of 2009 according to RealtyTrac, the highest since
it began recording in 2005.66 A report issued by the Mortgage
Bankers Association on August 20, 2009 found that the
combined percentage of loans in foreclosure and those otherwise
delinquent was over 13% of all mortgages outstanding (more
than one in eight loans), “the highest ever recorded in the MBA
delinquency survey,” which commenced in its current form in

64

See David Streitfeld, Housing Perks Up, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2009,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/26/business/economy/26econ.
html?_r=1&sep+1&sq=housing%20perks%20up&st=cse
(citing
CaseSchiller index report showing modest increases in housing prices in June
2009 in 18 of the 20 major U.S. metropolitan areas).
65
The detailed causes of the foreclosure crisis have been much discussed
and debated. Neither of the thesis points in this paper, that our
homeownership policies have not resulted in a stable housing situation and
that a focus on rental housing is needed, are contingent on identifying the
exact causes and culprits. However, I do believe the causes are complex and
involve the following intertwined phenomenon: (i) the development of an
overheated secondary market for funding mortgage loans, (ii) the creation of
more exotic, complex and risky loan products that were designed for
subprime borrowers but were soon pushed on all borrowers; (iii) an
unparalleled run up in home prices; (iv) Americans taking out more and
bigger mortgage loans and home equity loans throughout the late 1990s and
early 2000; and finally (v) a severe economic recession and resulting job
losses. See generally Adams, supra note 60, at 599–607 (discussing above
mentioned causes of the foreclosure crisis); Raymond H. Brescia, Part of the
Disease or Part of the Cure: The Financial Crisis and the Community
Reinvestment Act, 60 S.C. L. REV. 617, 618, 620–27 (providing statistics on
the subprime mortgage crisis).
66
See Les Christie, 1.5 million homes in foreclosure in ‘09,
CNNMONEY.COM, July 16, 2009 http://money.cnn.com/2009/07/16/real_
estate/RealtyTrac_foreclosure_report/.
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1972.67 Notably, the foreclosure problems are increasingly
affecting prime borrowers who have lost their jobs, as opposed
to the 2006–2008 foreclosures which primarily affected those
with subprime and/or adjustable rate loans.68 Experts predict that
in 2009, 2.4 million homes will be lost to foreclosure or short
sales.69 Another 1.7 million homes were foreclosed in 2008.70
Overall, between 2009–2012, Credit Suisse estimates that
between 8 and 9 million homes will be foreclosed.71 And many
of these homes, once foreclosed, are lying dormant. In July
2009 the US Census Bureau estimated that more than 10% of all
homes were vacant.72
The foreclosure crisis demonstrates one of the downsides of
the constant push for homeownership. By creating incentives for
borrowers to incur more and more mortgage debt and shielding
the profits from capital gains tax, federal housing policy
67

See Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Association, Delinquencies
Continue to Climb, Foreclosures Flat in Latest MBA National Delinquency
Survey, (Aug. 20, 2009), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/
NewsandMedia/PressCenter/70050.htm.
68
See Peter Goodman & Jack Healy, Job Losses Push Safer Mortgages
to Foreclosure, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2009, at A1; Nick Timiraos, Souring
Prime Loans Compound Mortgage Woes, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2009, at
A4. “Subprime” mortgages are intended “for borrowers with significant
credit history problems.” SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 234 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
69
Center for Responsible Lending, Subprime Spillover: Accelerating
Foreclosures to Cost Neighbors $502 Billon in 2009 Alone, May 7, 2009,
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/
soaring-spillover-accelerating-foreclosures-to-cost-neighbors-436-billion-in2009-alone-73–4-million-homes-lose-5-900-on-average.html.
70
Simon, Banks Ramp Up Foreclosures, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2009, at
A1 (citing estimates available at http://www.economy.com).
71
Rod Dubitsky et al., Foreclosure Update: Over 8 Million Foreclosures
Expected, CREDIT SUISSE, Dec. 4, 2008, at 1.
72
See U.S. Census Bureau News, supra note 17, at 1; see also Haya El
Nasser, Open House, Anyone? 1 in 9 Homes Sit Empty, USA TODAY, Apr.
10, 2009; cf. John Leland, With Advocates Help, More Squatters Are Calling
Foreclosures Home, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2009, at A1 (describing growing
phenomenon in Philadelphia, Minnesota, Miami, where organized grassroots
efforts are placing homeless persons in foreclosed or abandoned homes).
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distorted the housing market and contributed to the real estate
bubble and subsequent crash. The millions of foreclosures have
had a devastating effect on the affected households, their
surrounding neighborhoods, and local governments.73 These
effects are reviewed below, beginning with individual
households.
B. Resulting Instability
1. Foreclosure Effects on Individuals
At its core, foreclosure leaves a family without a place to
live and increases the risk of homelessness. On a financial level,
foreclosure results in the loss of the largest financial asset most
households will ever own.74 This greatly compromises the
household’s ability to borrow for important investments like
higher education, retirement, or to provide for future
generations.75 The lowered credit score resulting from
73

Tad Friend, Cash for Keys, NEW YORKER, Apr. 6, 2009 (describing
the dramatic dislocation effects of foreclosure on individual households and
the potential for social upheaval as a result of foreclosure crisis); see, e.g.,
Prentiss Cox, Foreclosure Reform Amid Mortgage Lending Turmoil: A Public
Purpose Approach, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 683, 726–27 (2008) (describing the
devastating impact to individual households and neighborhoods, especially
where foreclosures are concentrated). See generally Florence Wagman
Roisman, The Right to Remain: Common Law Protections for Security of
Tenure: An Essay in Honor of John Otis Calmore, 86 N.C.L. REV. 817
(2008) (describing the impact of eviction on families and society at large).
74
NEIGHBORHOOD HOUS. SERVICES OF CHICAGO, PRESERVING
HOMEOWNERSHIP: COMMUNITY-DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW
MORTGAGE MARKET 21 (Mar. 25, 2004), available at http://www.nw.org/
network/neighborworksProgs/foreclosuresolutionsOLD/documents/preserving
HomeownershipRpt.pdf.
75
Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Debt Crisis and the Reinforcement of
Class Position, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 557, 607 & n.274 (Spring 2009) (“At
the point where a consumer’s liabilities eclipse his or her assets, the
indicators of upward class mobility—economic equilibrium and stability, the
ability to enhance human capital in order to specialize, the wherewithal to
take risks and have a positive vision of the future, as well as the capacity to
offer
future
generations
greater
opportunities—correspondingly
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foreclosure makes future homeownership more difficult, may
decrease job prospects, and limits the ability to obtain insurance
or rental housing.76 The changes in school, friends and social
networks are disruptive to children’s development.77 The
accumulation of these decreased opportunities as a result of the
loss of one’s home affect an individual’s positive vision of the
future and ability to rebound—ultimately resulting in the loss of
middle class status.78
2. Foreclosure Effects on Neighborhoods
At a community level, foreclosures lead to blight and
disinvestment.79 Most immediately, foreclosures of multifamily
disappear . . . . Moreover, the loss of a home is the loss of an asset that
could have been handed down to the next generation.”).
76
Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External Costs of Foreclosure:
The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values, 17
HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 57, 58 (2006); see also, NEIGHBORHOOD HOUS.
SERVICES OF CHICAGO, supra note 74, at 13–20.
77
See Christine Vidmar, Seven Ways Foreclosures Impact Communities,
NeighborWorks America, Aug. 2008, available at http://neighborworks.
issuelab.org/research/listing/seven_ways_foreclosures_impact_communities;
see also Phillip Lovell & Julia Issacs, The Impact of the Mortgage Crisis on
Children, FIRST FOCUS, May 2008, at 1, available at http://www.firstfocus.
net/Download/HousingandChildrenFINAL.pdf.
78
Jeannie Suk, Taking the Home, 20 CARDOZO STUD. LAW &
LITERATURE 291, 295 (“The social meaning of home loss is the loss of a
family’s economic stability, and with that the loss of middle-class status.”);
see also Robert Schiller, The Scars of Losing a Home, N.Y. TIMES, May 18,
2008, at 5 (“[I]t is important to consider the psychological trauma of
foreclosure [since homeownership is a] fundamental part of a sense of
belonging to a country.”); Brad Heath & Charisse Jones, In Denver,
Foreclosures and a Dramatic Exodus, USA TODAY, Apr. 2, 2008, at A1
(“For hundreds of homeowners in this mostly middle-class corner of
Denver—and an estimated 1.2 million more nationwide—the wave of
foreclosures battering U.S. financial markets is quickly unraveling the
American dream. Those who have lost homes here describe seeing their lives
crumble into anxiety and embarrassment.”).
79
See Prentiss Cox, Foreclosure Reform Amid Mortgage Lending
Turmoil: A Public Purpose Approach, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 683, 686 (2008)
(“Rising foreclosures have started to blight certain areas of American cities
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buildings usually result in the displacement of tenants. Secretary
Shaun Donovan of the U.S. Department of Housing & Urban
Development (HUD) recently stated that 40% of those displaced
to date from the foreclosure crisis have been renters.80 The
federal government has tried to address the effect of foreclosures
on tenants. Congress passed a new law in May 2009 that
protects tenants from immediate eviction by persons or entities
that become owners of property through foreclosure. Under the
law, the immediate successor in interest at foreclosure must:
(a) provide bona fide tenants with 90 days notice prior to
eviction; and, (b) allow bona fide tenants with leases to occupy
property until the end of the lease term, except the lease can be
terminated on 90 days notice if the unit is sold to a purchaser
who will occupy the property.81 In New Jersey and New
Hampshire, with statutes that restrict a landlord’s right to evict
for good cause, bona fide renters are protected when their
buildings are foreclosed.82 Despite these efforts to limit the
effects of foreclosure, communities surrounding foreclosed
homes have suffered greatly in the current crisis.
Increasingly, foreclosures result in vacancies, which in turn
lead to an array of public health concerns. These concerns
include arson, which in turn exposes lead paint, trash
accumulation, illegal dumping, and rodent infestations.83 In
hit hardest by the problem.”).
80
Erika Morphy, HUD Plays Key Role in Financial System Revamp,
GLOBE ST., June 18, 2009, available at http://www.globest.com/news/
1435_1435/washington/179338; see also, Abby Goodnough, Hard Times
Hitting New England Three Deckers, New England’s City Backdrop,
N.Y.TIMES, June 20, 2009, at A1 (chronicling how multifamily buildings in
New England’s cities are being foreclosed on as a higher rate than homes
overall); Vicki Been & Allegra Glasshauser, The Worst of Times:
Perspectives on and Solutions for the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2 ALB.
GOV’T L. REV 1, 2–3 (2009) (chronicling how foreclosure crisis is
“significantly impacting renters throughout the country” because most states
allow the purchaser at a foreclosure sale to evict the existing tenants).
81
See Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111–22, 123 Stat. 1632 (2009).
82
See Been & Glasshauser, supra note 80, at 16.
83
John P. Relman, Foreclosures, Integration, and the Future of the Fair
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addition, foreclosures result in higher crime rates for the
surrounding community.84 This type of blight decreases property
values of neighboring homeowners and thus dissuades further
investment.85 Community destabilization and disinvestment are
especially pronounced where foreclosures are geographically
concentrated.86
3. Foreclosure Effects on
Local Governments
Finally, foreclosures have a detrimental impact on the fiscal
stability of states and localities in which they occur. For
example, one study found that foreclosures in Chicago involve

Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 629, 650 (2008) (“Foreclosures mean
abandoned homes; increased risks of fire, crime, and drugs; increases in
homelessness and job loss; deterioration of schools; and a crippling shortage
of city funds for existing social programs.”)
84
Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The Impact of Single-Family
Mortgage Foreclosures on Neighborhood Crime, 21 HOUSING STUD. 851, 863
(2006) (“These findings suggest that foreclosures may have important social
and economic consequences on neighborhoods beyond effects on the finances
of households directly affected by the foreclosure. An increase in violent
crime is an important social cost, as well as an economic cost, that must be
incorporated into policy making concerning real estate and mortgage lending
policies and regulation.”); see also, Michael Powell & Janet Roberts,
Minorities Affected Most as New York Foreclosures Rise, N.Y. TIMES, May
16, 2009 (citing Immergluck & Smith).
85
See Immergluck & Smith, supra note 84, at 58; Soaring Spillover:
Accelerating Foreclosures to Cost Neighbors $502 Billon in 2009 Alone,
CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, May 7, 2009, http://www.responsible
lending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/soaring-spillover-acceleratingforeclosures-to-cost-neighbors-436-billion-in-2009-alone-73-4-million-homeslose-5-900-on-average.html; see also Vidmar, supra note 77; Elsa Brenner,
Freeing Towns to Tackle Blight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2009, at RE9
(describing effect of foreclosures on local property values in affluent
neighborhoods of Mount Vernon, NY).
86
See Jenny Schuetz et al., Neighborhood Effects of Concentrated
Mortgage Foreclosures (NYU Center for Law and Economics, Working
Paper No. 08–41 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1270121; Cox,
supra note 79, at 693.
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more than a dozen city agencies and generate costs that in some
cases exceeded $30,000 per property.87 Other effects include
declining property tax revenues resulting from declining
property values described above.88 Thus the foreclosures create a
downward spiral effect: just at the time that local governments
are called on to deal with the effects of the foreclosure crisis,
that very crisis has resulted in less tax revenue with which to
help.
In sum, the detrimental effects of the housing bubble and
crash have extended far beyond the foreclosed homeowners. One
category of victims of the foreclosure crisis, renters, have been
suffering from decades of government neglect.
IV. THE CRISIS IN RENTAL HOUSING
The damage wrought by millions of foreclosures has, among
other things, exposed the chronic crisis in the rental housing
market. There are two fundamental defects in the rental housing
market: (i) there is a desperate lack of rental housing affordable
to low- and moderate- income households; and (ii) there is a
need for increasing the options through which renters can obtain
economic and psychological stability in their housing. Each will
be explored in turn.
A. Need for More Affordable Rental Housing
As noted in the introductory section, almost one third of all
89
Americans (36 million households) are renters. Furthermore,
87

WILLIAM C. APGAR & MARK DUDA, WASH. DC: HOMEOWNERSHIP
PRESERVATION FOUND., COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE MUNICIPAL IMPACT OF
TODAY’S MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BOOM 4 (2005), http://www.995hope.
org/content/pdf/Apgar_Duda_Study_Short_Version.pdf.
88
Alan Weinstein, Current and Future Challenges to Local Governments
Posed by the Housing and Credit Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 259, 266
(2008) (describing challenges including revenue shortfalls and rising costs);
see also Vidmar, supra note 77 at 2–3.
89
See Donald R. Haurin et al., The Impact of Neighborhood
Homeownership Rates: A Review of the Theoretical and Empirical Literature,
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the number of households needing rental housing is expanding.
A recent report found that: “the number of renter households
jumped by 2.8 percent or nearly one million in 2007.”90 And
that trend had already begun before the worst of the foreclosure
wave hit—the foreclosure crisis has added many families to the
list of those who are in need of rental housing.91 All renters must
deal with the fact that the supply of rental units has not been
keeping up with demand.92 One study found that “84% of all the
new housing units built from 1990 to 2006 were single family
units . . . although an average of 34% of all households were
renters during that entire period.”93 A vast majority of these
single family units built were for sale and not offered as
rentals.94
The failure of the rental supply to meet the growing demand
has exacerbated the affordability gap that has long plagued many
rental households. Indeed, by the end of 2007 almost half of all
rental households in the United States were rent burdened95
(spending more than 30% of their gross income on housing

J. HOUSING RESEARCH 119–51 (2003); see also Apgar 2004, supra note 5, at
3; see also Katz & Turner, supra note 5, at 2.
90
See HARVARD UNIV. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, AMERICA’S
RENTAL HOUSING-THE KEY TO A BALANCED NATIONAL POLICY 2 (2008)
[hereinafter HARVARD UNIV. CTR. FOR JOINT HOUSING STUDIES, BALANCED
POLICY], available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/rental/rh08_
americas_rental_housing/rh08_americas_rental_housing_bw.pdf; see also id.
at 8 (“Today’s mortgage makers woes will not only force many owners into
the rental market but also limit the homebuyers opportunities for other lowerincome renters.”); id. at 9 (“If foreclosures continue to rise, renter household
growth could return to levels not seen in a decade.”).
91
See id. at 8.
92
See, e.g., Benson, supra note 2, at 2 (“For years, growth in the
number of renters at all income levels has far outpaced the construction of
new rental units.”).
93
See Downs Why, supra note 9, at 7.
94
See id.
95
See SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 23. (“The most common standard of
housing affordability in the [U.S.] is 30% of income. Households spending
30% or more of their pre-tax income on housing are viewed as having a
excessive housing cost burden.”).
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costs) and 24% of all rental households were severely rent
burdened96 (spending more than 50% of their gross income on
housing costs).97 These numbers represented significant increases
from just seven years prior, in 2001.98 Looking at such numbers,
as well as the increased number of rental units needed to house
foreclosed households, Arthur Nelson, director of the University
of Utah’s Metropolitan Research Center, recently concluded that
half of all the units built in the coming years need to be
rentals.99 Whether or not that figure is precise, the larger point is
that the United States needs significant investment in rental
housing in order to correct the market imbalances and bring
rents more in line with families’ incomes.
Notably, two corollaries of the current housing crisis—the
glut of vacant homes and increased number of homes converted
from for sale to rental status—seem to be reducing market rents
charged.100 In Phoenix investors are reportedly purchasing
96

See id. (“Housing cost burdens are defined as severe when housing
expenses amount to 50% or more of income.”).
97
HARVARD UNIV. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, THE STATE OF THE
NATION’S HOUSING 2009 3 tbl.A–5 (2009), available at http://www.jchs.
harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2009/son2009.pdf [hereinafter JOINT
CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, State of the Nation]; see Katz & Turner, supra
note 5, at 38 (“[G]ross rents . . . have grown faster than inflation while
median renter’s monthly income has declined 7.3 percent since 2000.”);
NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., OUT OF REACH 4 (2009) available at
http://www.nlihc.org/oor/oor2009/oor2009pub.pdf (calculating the current
“housing wage,” or the amount it takes to afford a modest two-bedroom
apartment at 30 percent of income, with the 2009 the national average
housing wage is $17.84 per hour, which was more than $3 in excess of the
average national hourly wage and more than $10 in excess of the national
minimum wage).
98
See HARVARD UNIV. CTR. FOR JOINT HOUSING STUDIES, STATE OF
THE NATION, supra note 97, at 38 tbl.A–5 (11.2% increase in households
rent burdened and 19.2% increase in those severely rent burdened).
99
See El Nasser, supra note 72 (noting that edges of metropolitan areas
will turn into “exurban ghettos” as many units are turned over to renters).
100
See Nick Timiraos, Apartment Glut Expands, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6,
2009 (citing a report showing 7.9% vacancy rate for apartments and a 2.7%
decrease in effective rental prices nationally); Shahien Nasiripour, Unable to
Sell Their Houses, Millions of Homeowners are Turning Into Landlords,
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foreclosed homes from banks at drastically reduced prices and
then renting them to the same households that have been
foreclosed.101 Along with others,102 Dean Baker of the Center for
Economic Policy Research has proposed that mortgage servicers
be forced to rent to delinquent homeowners at market rental
prices as a part of a negotiated foreclosure.103 Reportedly,
officials from the Obama Administration are considering Baker’s
proposal.104 While future substantial drops in rental prices may
occur, the real estate crisis thus far has resulted in only a
relatively small reduction in rental prices.105 There is no
evidence that the housing market has in any long lasting way
addressed the affordability crisis that has built up since the
1980s.106

HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 14, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/09/
14/unable-to-sell-their-hous_n_283655.html (describing 2.5 million units
being converted from for sale to rentals since 2007, although many may be
rentals only until the for sale market picks up).
101
See David Streitfeld, Amid Housing Bust, Phoenix Begins a New
Frenzy, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2009, at A1.
102
See, e.g., David Kappell, A Rental Model Could Solve The Housing
Crisis, NEWSDAY, Apr. 17, 2009, available at http://www.newsday.com/
opinion/a-rental-model-could-solve-the-housing-crisis-1.1219384. The author,
a former mayor on Long Island, notes the fact that millions of homes lie
dormant waiting for buyers while millions of households need housing as a
result of foreclosure, proposing that mortgage servicers agree to rent homes
in foreclosure to the current occupants.
103
See DEAN BAKER, THE RIGHT TO RENT PLAN (Ctr. for Econ. Policy
Research 2009), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/
right-to-rent-2009-07.pdf.
104
See Patrick Rucker, Obama Mulls Rental Option for Homeowners,
REUTERS, July 14, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/euRegulatoryNews/
idUSN1429055220090714.
105
See Timiraos, supra note 100 (citing a 2.7% decrease in effective
rental prices nationally); JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, State of the Nation,
supra note 97 at 21 (real rents fell by 0.2 percent nationally in 2008).
106
See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, Balanced Policy, supra note 90,
at 3 (“With these large, unprecedented shifts on both the demand and supply
sides of the rental market, the direction of rents is impossible to predict.”);
see also Joint Center for Housing Studies, Fact Sheet-America’s Rental
Housing-The Key to a Balanced National Policy, Apr. 30, 2008 (noting new
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As detailed below, changes to U.S. government housing
policy107 over the past thirty years have resulted in fewer rental
units being built and maintained that are affordable to low and
moderate income households. The first of these changes has
been the dramatic decrease in federal funding appropriated
through HUD for rental subsidies.108 (As discussed in Section
I.B, this has been accompanied by a dramatic increase in federal
subsidies going to homeowners). Specifically, HUD has funded
virtually no new public housing units since 1980 and drastically
cut back on the number of projects receiving building wide
Section 8 assistance.109 Not only has new production of HUDassisted units diminished, but also hundreds of thousands of
previously HUD-assisted units have been removed by their
owners from the applicable governmental programs and brought
to market rate.110 In addition, changes to the Income Tax Law in

wave of foreclosed homes being rented but stating that “most renters do not
have adequate income to take advantage of these opportunities”); National
Low Income Housing Coalition, New Census Housing Data Confirm Number
of Renters Facing Housing Problems on the Rise, Sept. 23, 2009 (analyzing
national census data and finding that, from 2006 to 2008, median gross rents
increased from $763 to $824 and that the number of rent burdened
households increased by 600,000).
107
While I focus here on national housing policy, local governments have
also played a role in restricting the number of rental units. Many of the
suburban and exurban communities which have grown so quickly over the
past thirty years have increasingly restricted zoning to exclude larger
multifamily buildings, or even rentals at all. This drives up the price of land
in communities which do allow for rentals and thereby decreases the supply
and affordability of housing that can be built. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 9,
at 37.
108
See SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 40–42.
109
See id. at 42. Project based Section 8 was a HUD administered
program during the 1980’s which gave owners rent subsidies for all qualified
units.
110
See id. at 36; see also Benson, supra note 2, at 2 (“Beyond cutting
back the level of spending on public housing operations and maintenance, the
Bush administration set policies at HUD that effectively reduced the number
of rental vouchers in use. Meanwhile, demolitions under HOPE VI, signed
into law by President George Bush in 1992, have driven a net loss of about
165,000 public housing units since 1995.”).
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1986 eliminated most of the accelerated depreciation benefits
that had until then been provided to investors in all rental
housing projects, with even more generous benefits for investors
of low income rental housing.111 While the introduction of the
low income housing tax credit (LIHTC)112 has had some success
in replacing accelerated depreciation as an incentive for equity
investment in low income rental projects, LIHTC funded
projects have not been able to stem the overall loss of affordable
units.113 Overall, the federal government spends roughly $30
billion annually to support rental housing for low to moderate
income households.114 This is less than one fourth of what it
spends for homeownership programs.115 This disparity, together
111

See SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 63, 78–81. In addition to the
challenge to the equity side of the financing model presented by the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, debt financing for multifamily rental housing was
severely curtailed by the failure of so many thrifts on the 1980’s which had
been the primary lenders for such rental projects. See id. at 62. The
legislative response to the failure of thrifts (the S+L Crisis) exacerbated this
development, creating significantly more restrictions on lending to
multifamily buildings as compared with single family properties. See id. at
62–63.
112
See I.R.C. § 42 (LEXIS 1986).
113
See SCHWARTZ supra note 9, at 81.
114
See Gale et al., supra note 16, at 1172–73 (citing $30 billion number
for 2005, which includes grant funds administered through HUD and the
Department of Agriculture for farmer/rural housing as well as various tax
benefits administered by the Treasury Department which support the
investment in low income rental housing, note that some of the funding in
this category goes to support homeownership programs as well so getting the
exact amount spent on rental programs is difficult); see also SCHWARTZ,
supra note 9, at 69 (citing $30 billion in “direct” housing subsidies, as
opposed to tax expenditures, some small percentage of this includes
homeownership subsidies); Downs, Why, supra note 9, at 7 (reporting that
the total federal outlays on rental housing were approximately $32.3 billion
for 2005. The highest percentage of this category of federal spending is
forgone tax revenue supporting the LIHTC program, as well as federal
outlays made to fund Section 8 vouchers). Section 8 vouchers provide a
direct rental subsidy to households, enabling them to spend no more than
30% of their gross income on rent. Id.
115
See Apgar 2004, supra note 5, at 12. (“For example, in fiscal year
2001, program outlays for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
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with federal funding decisions begun after World War II which
have prioritized highways over mass transit and similar antiurban and anti-density measures, have distorted the market for
rental housing by favoring construction and ownership of single
family suburban and exurban homes.116
Beyond the need for more rental units generally, and
affordable units in particular, there is a further need for more
stable rental options for a growing number of households.
B. Need for Rental Stability
A report completed before the foreclosure crisis found that
the number of stable renters was already significant: “More than
a quarter of renter households surveyed in 2005 reported they
had lived in their units for five or more years.”117 With more
opportunities for stable tenure and some rent protection as
proposed below, that number would undoubtedly be significantly
higher. The category of households seeking stable tenancies
includes, at a minimum, low- to moderate-income families who
are looking to put down roots in a community, senior citizens

Development totaled $33.6 billion. In contrast, that same fiscal year federal
tax expenditures for housing totaled $121.2 billion with tax related
expenditures for homeowners (including mortgage interest and property tax
deductions, and capital gains exclusion) accounting for $106 billion of that
total.”); see also Section II.B and sources cited therein.
116
See Thomas J. Sugrue, The New American Dream: Renting, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 15, 2009 (“Federal housing policies changed the whole
landscape of America, creating the sprawlscapes that we now call home and
in the process, gutting inner cities . . . .”). See generally JACKSON, supra
note 14.
117
HARVARD UNIV. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSing. STUDIES, THE STATE OF
THE NATION’S HOUSING 2008, supra note 52, at 23. Cf. Ellickson, The
Mediocrity, supra note 52, at 15 (stating that each year “about one-third of
U.S. tenant households move to new quarters” according to a 2003 study
from the U.S. Department of Commerce); Ellickson, Legal Constraints,
supra note 52, at 6 n. 8 (citing an annual moving rate in the United States of
32.5% for renters and 9.1% for owners, compared with annual moving rates
of 17% for French renters and 4% for French homeowners).
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and the disabled.118 In addition, the millions of foreclosures will
dramatically increase the number of tenants who need augmented
rental stability.119 To the extent that some of these households
can create sustainable homeownership solutions, such a result
would be a good outcome for those households. But there is
undoubtedly some significant percentage of the American
population for which homeownership does not make sense.120
Under our free market based economic and property systems,
many households do not have the financial means and/or the
desire to be homeowners, with the full set of responsibilities that
homeownership entails.121
118

See Courtney Gross, Affordable Housing Not Included, Gotham
Gazette, Oct. 5, 2009 (describing disabled woman whose rent in the
gentrified neighborhood of Williamsburg, Brooklyn was recently raised from
$550 to $2100 when her building was purchased by a new owner).
119
See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
120
See Apgar 2004, supra note 5, at 5 (“Public policy should focus on
the larger goals of promoting access to decent and affordable housing, along
with expanding social and economic opportunity for all, and in doing so
recognize that promoting homeownership is just one of many possible means
for achieving these end goals.”). But see Dalton Connolly, Op Ed., Safe at
Home, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2009 (arguing in favor of increased programs to
promote and protect homeownership options for low-income households).
121
See Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 9, at 969–70 for a discussion of
the rights and responsibilities of homeowners and renters (“[He or she] who
owns a fee simple possesses the largest possible share of the rights in the
iconic property bundle (use, possession, the right to exclude, and the right to
transfer), while a person or family who possesses a leasehold interest has
occupancy rights to the property only for a specified period of time . . . .
[T]he fee owner of a rental property is also subject to legally imposed
obligations to the leaseholder, like ensuring that the property is habitable.”);
see also Apgar 2004, supra note 5, at 10 (“[T]enant/landlord laws and
regulations govern the obligation of the property owner to meet certain
standards of service provision and process concerning rent setting and
eviction, as well as responsibilities of the tenant (including making rent
payments in a timely manner). At the same time, tenants retain the option to
vacate the property on relatively short notice . . . . Home owners generally
have a more expansive set of rights, but also more responsibilities. Local
zoning, building and health codes along with other land use regulations
impose responsibilities on owners . . . or otherwise place limitations on the
use of an owner occupied property.”).
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As demonstrated above, the demand for moderately priced
rental units exceeds supply in many parts of the United States.
This gives landlords enormous leverage over low to moderateincome rental households, and puts such tenants at a severe
disadvantage when trying to bargain for long-term rental
security. Thus many tenants are vulnerable to eviction on thirty
days notice at the end of their leases.122 Indeed, a study
completed in 1999 found that more than 97% of all private
market residential leases (outside jurisdictions with rent
regulation123) are for 1 year or less.124
Given the failure of the market to provide sufficient
affordable and stable rental units, it is understandable that many
families overstretched their budgets in the past 15 years to
purchase a home.125 One recent study demonstrated the
relationship between the lack of affordable and stable rental
options and the demand for homeownership by proving that
households use homeownership to insure or “hedge” against
predicted increases in future rent payments.126 The authors
122

See Chester Hartman & David Robinson, Evictions: The Hidden
Housing Problem, 14 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 461, 463 (“[F]ew lowerincome tenants have leases, and if there is no lease . . . a landlord can evict
without stating a reason, with only 30 days’ notice.”); Apgar 2004, supra
note 5, at 56 (“[M]any families with children presumably would also value a
chance to remain in their rental apartment for some time, but lacking a steady
and secure source of income struggle to do so.”).
123
In this paper I use the term “rent regulation” to refer generally to
local and state laws which restrict the ability of landlords to raise rents. Thus
rent regulation includes rent control, rent stabilization, rent restrictions and
the like.
124
See David Genesove, The Nominal Rigidity of Apartment Rents 16,
tbl.7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7137, 1999),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7137 (using data obtained from the
Property Owners and Managers Survey).
125
See Apgar 2004, supra note 5, at 5 (“[M]any low-wealth and lowincome families are being ‘pushed’ into homeownership, not necessarily
because they fully appreciate the implications of their choices, but because
they perceive (or rather hope) that homeownership in and of itself will help
them achieve a better life.”).
126
Todd Sinai & Nichola S. Souleles, Owner-Occupied Housing as a
Hedge Against Rent Risk, 120 Q. J. ECON., 763 (2005); see also Fennell,
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summarized their findings by saying that “the rent-hedging
benefit substantially increases the demand for owner occupied
housing, for the population as a whole and especially for the
elderly.”127 This study, together with the inadequacy of the rental
options available to households at the lower end of the socioeconomic scale, suggest that improving the availability of
affordable and stable rental options would reduce the demand for
homeownership among such households. While such reduced
demand is inconsistent with housing policy of the past 20 years,
it is exactly the right response to the current foreclosure crisis.128
V. RENTAL STABILITY PROGRAM PROPOSED
Now is the time for policy makers to implement new
protections for rental households. The growing crisis for
families seeking affordable and stable rental options makes this a
crucial imperative. The harder question to answer is what kind
of rental protections are needed and what effect such protections
will have on the overall market for rental housing. In drafting
my proposal, my fundamental goal is to create increased
opportunities for renters to obtain some meaningful measure of
security in their tenure. Achieving stability of an infinite
129
(the present
duration, as promised by homeownership
supra note 8, at 1054–55 (“A much-cited advantage of owning a home is the
element of price protection it provides. In housing markets without rent
control, tenants face significant uncertainty about how much their current
housing will cost in future periods.”).
127
Sinai & Souleles, supra note 126.
128
See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES 2009 at 25 (advocating for “new
recognition of the risks that homeownership brings” and suggesting that now
is a good time “to rethink federal affordable housing policy, which has until
recently strongly favored homeownership programs”). Cf. Joseph Williams,
President Shifts Focus to Renting, Not Owning, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 16,
2009 (quoting Massachusetts Representative Barney Frank as stating that “the
American dream should be a home—not homeownership”).
129
See Fennell, supra note 8, at 1056 (“In contrast [to renters], all
homeowners possess something very valuable—the option to remain in their
current homes for as long as they wish, provided they make the necessary
mortgage and tax payments.”).
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foreclosure crisis notwithstanding) is not my goal. Rather,
tenants should have the option to enter into leases for a
minimum of 5 years, and have rights to renew leases at
reasonable rental increases for some certain amount of time, I
propose ten years, absent certain changed or exigent
circumstances on the landlord’s side.130
A. Rental Stability Program Detailed
The Rental Stability Program (hereinafter “the RSP”) I
propose for states and localities to consider131 has a basic
structure akin to the rent stabilization regime currently in effect
in New York City,132 with some important differences that seek
to accomplish my goals of increasing rental stability without
undermining the basic market incentives for landlords. Under
the RSP, landlords of buildings with more than 5 rental units
would be required to register their rental units with an
administrative body at an initial rent set only by the market.
Landlords would be required to offer tenants the option to lease
for terms of at least 1, 2 or 5 years.133 No matter which term of

130

See Apgar 2004, supra note 5, at 56 (“To help families maintain
longer term occupancy, and make better use of available support services, it
would be useful to create model landlord tenant laws that include clearly
articulated and easily enforceable residential leases designed to promote
longer-term, more stable occupancy.”).
131
As detailed infra in Section V, my proposal would require enabling
legislation at the state level, and then be subject to adoption (or not) by
municipal governments. Since RSP is designed to be appropriate in a number
of urban housing markets, some of its parameters are subject to change as
dictated by choices by state and local governments.
132
For an introduction to New York City’s rent stabilization regimes, see
TIMOTHY COLLINS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW YORK CITY RENT
GUIDELINES BOARD AND THE RENT STABILIZATION SYSTEM (New York City
Rent Guidelines Bd. ed., 2006) (2001), available at http://www.housingnyc.
com/html/about/intro/toc.html.
133
With this requirement, I seek to adapt a small portion of the European
model of residential leases to the American context. France requires a
minimum lease term of 3 years for apartments owned by individuals, and 6
years for units owned by corporations, after which time the owner may

CHASE REVISED.DOC

4/27/2010 7:32 PM

RETHINKING THE HOMEOWNERSHIP SOCIETY

95

lease is chosen by the tenant, each year rent increases134 would
be allowed up to the maximum permitted by a rent guidelines
board (hereinafter “RGB”), as is currently in place in New York
City.135 The RGB would consider all of the landlords’ legitimate
costs in operating buildings (taxes and other fees, maintenance,
utilities, labor, cost of capital) and calculate reasonable increases
for the coming year.136 Additional increases would be allowed
based on needed repairs completed to the individual unit or the
building. In addition to the rent increases to cover the landlords’
costs, the landlord would be permitted market-based increases at
the earliest of the following points in time: (i) ten years after the
initial lease date of that tenant; (ii) the commencement of the
fourth consecutive lease renewal by the same tenant; and
(iii) vacancy of the unit. At the end of the term of the lease,
absent certain good cause factors, the landlord would be
required to offer tenants a renewal lease with the same term
options (1, 2 or 5 years). New tenants would have the exact
same deal, that is, the initial rent would be set at market and the
terminate the lease or get market rent increases. See Jane Ball, Renting
Homes: Status and Security in the UK and France: A Comparison In the
Light Of the Law Commission’s Proposals, 67 CONV. & PROP. LAW. 50
(2003); see also Andrea Carroll, The International Trend Toward Requiring
Good Cause for Tenant Eviction: Dangerous Portents for the United States,
38 SETON HALL L. REV. 427, 440, 446 n.139 (2008) (discussing the reasons
a French landlord can terminate a lease and describing a 1978 Landlord
Tenant law which dictates that Italian leases cannot be less than 4 years).
134
The rationale for annual rent increases is based largely on my
interview with Marvin Markus, who explained that projecting costs more than
one year in advance in purely speculative. It was this rationale, Markus
stated, that led to a change in 1983 which limited the choice of New York
City Rent Stabilized tenants to one or two years; prior to the enactment of the
Omnibus Housing Act of 1983, tenants were given the additional option of
choosing three year leases. Interview with Marvin Markus, Chairman, Rent
Guidelines Bd. held at Markus’ offices at Goldman Sachs on June 1, 2009;
see COLLINS, supra note 132, at 35 (stating legal change but not asserting
rationale).
135
For an introduction to the RGB in New York City, see generally
COLLINS, supra note 132.
136
For a list of factors the New York RGB considers, on which my
proposal is based, see N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 26-510 (McKinney 2009).
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tenant would have the option of a 1, 2 or 5 year lease, with
annual increases set by the RGB.
To protect the settled economic expectations of certain
classes of tenants who desire long-term stability, an integral part
of the RSP is a new rental subsidy modeled loosely on New
York’s existing Senior Citizen Rent Increase Exemption.137
Tenants under a specific income threshold, which I suggest be
set at somewhere between 80-120% of the area median
income,138 would be entitled to a federally funded rental
subsidy139 to cover all rent increases from the initial registered
rent (which include the allowable increase for that year as set by
the RGB, as well as increases permissible for that specific
building or unit due to improvements). In addition to the income
137

See N.Y. Unconsol. Laws. Law § 26-509 (Mckinney 2009); see also
ANDREW SCHERER & FERN FISHER, RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT LAW
IN NEW YORK §4:305 (2008) (summary of SCRIE law).
138
I suggest that the RSP rental subsidy be provided to households with
incomes at or below 80–120% of Area Median Income (AMI) for the
following reasons: First, for the 80% ceiling, HUD defines low income as
households at or below 80% of AMI and any low income household should
be included in the rental subsidy. A higher threshold of eligibility for the
RSP rental subsidy may be appropriate for areas which have exceptionally
high housing costs—for example, the City of New York Housing
Development Corporation has programs targeting households with incomes at
or below 130% of AMI, recognizing that in such an expensive city, higher
income households still need assistance with housing expenses. See New
York City Hous. Dev. Corp., New Housing Opportunities Program—New
HOP, http://www.nychdc.com/pdf/developers/new.hop.termsheet_2008.pdf
(last visited Sept. 30, 2009) (term sheet for the 2008 “New HOP” program).
As background, the website for Freddie Mac defines “Area Median Income”
as follows: “Midpoint in the family-income range for a metropolitan
statistical area or for the non-metro parts of a state. The figure often is used
as a basis to stratify incomes into low, moderate and upper ranges.” Cf.
Adams, Homeownership, supra note 60, at 577 (quoting Census Department
definition of Median income: “the amount which divides the income
distribution into two equal groups, half having incomes above the median,
half having incomes below the median”).
139
Cf. BRUCE KATZ & MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER, RETHINKING U.S.
RENTAL HOUSING POLICY 8–9 (Harvard University Joint Center for Housing
Studies 2007) (suggesting new pools of housing vouchers, akin to Section 8,
to address rental needs in high cost areas).
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threshold, receipt of the RSP rental subsidy would be available
only to households who do not already receive Section 8 or
other rental subsidies, and who affirm in a sworn statement that
(i) the rent exceeded 30% of the household’s gross income for
the year prior to lease renewal as reported on tax returns,140 and
(ii) they expected that the household’s income would remain
below the threshold income level for the coming year. Subsidies
for the future years of the lease term would be subject to the
tenant providing similar proof and affirmation to the RSP
administrative entity. When the landlord takes a market based
increase as allowed under the RSP (at the earlier of the fourth
consecutive lease renewal or the tenth year from the date of the
initial lease), then the rental subsidy would end. It may seem
counterintuitive for the RSP rental subsidy to terminate at the
point at which market based increases could be taken, since this
is the very point at which households would be most
vulnerable.141 However, ending the rental subsidy at this point is
consistent with the RSP’s overall structure as a modest, time
limited program which is designed to keep costs at a
minimum.142 The opposite policy of allowing the rental subsidy
to continue indefinitely would require the government to
subsidize potentially unlimited rent increases. This would lead to
budgetary challenges as well as a possible erosion of public
support.
B. The Fine Print: Legal/Administrative Structure of RSP
The RSP is shaped to adapt to many of the urban rental

140

Households spending more than 30% of gross income on housing
expenses are considered “rent burdened.” See SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at
23.
141
I would suggest that the RSP be accompanied with programs similar
to those in effect in New York City protecting the elderly and disabled after
RSP protections and subsidies expire. See generally COLLINS, supra note 127
(describing the New York City Rent Guidelines Board and Rent Stabilization
System).
142
See infra Section V.C.
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housing markets throughout the United States.143 There are
important differences in these rental markets which impact not
only whether a regime like the RSP is good policy, but also the
exact contours the program should take.144 These decisions are
best left to state and local legislatures. Some of the pertinent
differences include the density of the locality,145 the kind and
size of rental projects that exist in each community,146 and, with
143

Even among some rent regulation defenders, there is some debate as
to whether it should apply outside of New York City. Interview with Marvin
Markus., Chairman, Rent Guidelines Bd., held at Markus’ offices at
Goldman Sachs on June 1, 2009). They point to New York City being unique
in terms of the importance and expense of rental housing to that City. Ellen
& O’Flaherty, supra note 52, at 19–36, offer an interesting discussion on this
question. They review the statistics comparing New York City to the nation’s
nine other biggest cities as well as the nine other most dense cities in terms
of percentage of persons who rent, the cost of housing, the length of the
rentals, and the density. On the percentage of renters, with 70% New York
City is at the top of the biggest cities, but is roughly equal to many smaller
cities such as Patterson, Jersey City, San Francisco and Cambridge.
Similarly, while New York City is near the top of the list in terms of cost of
housing, it is not the highest and when compared with income, is more in the
middle of the pack. The only 2 categories analyzed in which New York City
is an outlier is the level of density, and the length that New York City
households remain in their apartments. Thirty Five percent of New York City
renters remained in their apartments between 1990 and 2000, while the
comparable number for the U.S. as a whole was under ten percent. Notably,
none of the other 9 biggest cities exceeded 18%, and none of the other 9
densest cities exceeded 23%. See id. at 32 & 51 tbl.711.
144
There are a number of specific components of the rent stabilization
portion of RSP that need fleshing out, for example whether to allow
succession rights to units for cohabitating family members. As indicated
infra, the time limited nature of the rent regulation makes these questions less
crucial than under unlimited systems.
145
See Ellen & O’Flaherty, supra note 52, at 31 (noting that localities
might be more likely to try to promote residential stability in dense
“residential environments [where the] development of trust and social capital
among neighbors seems more critical”).
146
See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, State of the Nation, supra note
97, at 22 & tbl.W-7 (noting that less than 10% of rentals are in buildings
with at least fifty units, more than a third of rental units are single-family
homes, including condominiums, and more than half are in buildings with
fewer than five apartments; also stating that “[s]ize is important because
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respect to the households seeking rental accommodation, their
ideal degree of mobility and economic make-up. For example,
jurisdictions that have a very high percentage of owners and in
which most renters are transitory or temporary may not want or
need the RSP. On the other hand, these very communities many
have pent up demand for rental units, which would emerge if
more stable rental options were offered. Recall the study which
found that more than 97% of all residential leases in nonregulated markets are for one year or less.147
Since states and localities would both be involved in
implementing the RSP, legislative action at each level would be
appropriate. I suggest state legislatures pass authorizing
legislation that would enable, but not compel, localities to adopt
the RSP within certain state prescribed programmatic
parameters.148 Local governments would then choose whether or
not to adopt the RSP and if so, exercise discretion to choose the
best program within the state prescribed parameters. In addition,
I suggest that one state agency be designated as the regulatory
authority for each of the localities in the state that adopt the
RSP.149 This would ensure consistent statewide application and
enforcement of the RSP. That state agency could also supervise
the RGB that sets annual cost based increases.150
In addition, the use of federal funds for the RSP rent subsidy
requires a programmatic vehicle for distributing these funds. I
[different sized] rental buildings differ systematically in location, year of
construction, and types of households they attract”).
147
Genesove, The Nominal Rigidity of Apartment Rents, supra note 124.
148
See, e.g., N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 8605 (McKinney’s 2009) (better
known as the Urstadt Law, which prevents the City of New York from
enacting rent regulation in a manner more restrictive than that authorized by
the New York State Legislature).
149
In New York State, the Division of Housing & Community Renewal
is charged with this role. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9,
§ 2520.1 (2009) (recognizing powers granted under Chapter 888 of the Laws
of New York of 1985).
150
As opposed to the practice in the State of New York, in which each
locality with rent regulation has its own rent setting board, I would suggest
one statewide RGB, with members appointed by the Governor, the tenant
community and the landlord community.
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would suggest that the RSP rental subsidy funds be distributed
by HUD as a block grant to each state.151 The amount provided
to each state would be determined by the number of rental
households in the state, a statistic gathered by the U.S. Census
Bureau. States that choose not to implement the RSP could use
the money for additional Section 8 Voucher Certificates, which
are distributed to very low income households to assist in
making rent payments.152
C. RSP Evaluation & Discussion: Primary & Secondary
Goals
1. Primary Goal
As stated above, the fundamental goal of the RSP is to
enable renting households to obtain more housing stability. How
will the results of the RSP match this goal? First, all renters
would have the option of longer lease terms, up to five years,
with rights to renew absent good cause for eviction by the
owner. Second, all renters would be protected from market
based rent increases (and low to moderate income households
who are rent-burdened would be protected from all rent
increases) for the shorter of ten years and the initiation of the
fourth consecutive lease renewal. Taken together, these first two
results meet my primary goal of providing more stable options
for renting households.
While the ten year limitation to the RSP’s rent benefits
would undoubtedly be a material hardship for some households,
there are compelling reasons to design the RSP in this way.
First, ten years of rent protection and rent subsidy (for eligible
households) provides families and individuals with sufficient
151

HUD administers a number of block grant programs which provide
grants to the states for certain prescribed uses, within which the states have
discretion to choose individual projects. The original program was the
Community Development Block Grant Program, enacted by Congress in
1974. See 24 C.F.R. 570.1 (2009).
152
For a brief description of the Section 8 Voucher Program, see supra
note 110.
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time to settle in a community, attach roots, and begin to climb
the economic ladder so that market-based rentals would not be
out of reach.153 If a family moved into the RSP protected
apartment when a child was eight, in third grade, the family’s
housing would be protected until the child became 18 and
scheduled to graduate from high school. Furthermore, most
renting households, whether in jurisdictions with rent regulation
or not, end up moving within ten years.154 The reform of the
federal welfare programs in the 1990’s provides an apt analogy.
These changes included eliminating a guarantee of eligibility for
the main cash welfare program (Aid to Families With Dependent
Children) as well as the addition or enhancement of other
benefits, including job training, child care and other resources
designed to enable recipient to gain increased economic
independence.155 By some accounts, these reforms helped push

153

Cf. Robert I. Lerman & Signe-Mary McKernan, Promoting
Neighborhood Improvement while Protecting Low-Income Families, 8 URB.
INST., OPPORTUNITY AND OWNERSHIP PROJECT 2 (2007), available at
http://www.urban.org/publications/311457.html (proposing 10 years as length
of guarantee for tenants of expected future benefits from renter insurance
product, discussed further infra Section VI.A). A valuable addition to RSP,
one wise commentator suggested to this author, would be a forced savings
program to run contiguously during the ten year period of rental regulation
and rental subsidy. This would help ensure that households were indeed more
able to afford market rents. Cf. Gale, supra note 16, at 1180–81 (proposing
savings program to encourage low and moderate-income households to save
for down payments as a part of a complete overhaul of the federal mortgage
interest deduction). While devising such a program is beyond the scope of
this paper, I note that the Obama Administration proposed a similar concept
as part of the 2010 Federal Budget as an alternative to the 401(k) employee
savings plans. See Pat Regnier, Why it’s Time to Create an Auto-IRA,
CNNMONEY.COM, Feb. 27, 2009, http://moneyfeatures.blogs.money.cnn.
com/2009/02/27/why-its-time-to-create-an-auto-ira/.
154
See Ellickson, Legal Constraints, supra note 52, at 8 (“Over a ten
year period, 83 percent of Chicago’s renting households changed dwellings,
compared to 65 percent of New York [City]’s.”); see also William M. Rohe
et al., The Social Benefits and Costs of Homeownership, JOINT CENTER FOR
HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY 13 (2001) (renters maintain their
residences for a median duration of 2.1 years).
155
See Ron Haskins, What Works is Work: Welfare Reform and Poverty
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millions of Americans into the work force; they also took away
much of the force of the conservative critiques of the existing
federal welfare program.156 Similarly, limiting the RSP rent
regulation and rental subsidy to ten years would likely push
households to increase economic self-sufficiency, thereby
helping to assuage potential conservative critics of the RSP.157
More generally, the ten year limitation fits within the RSP’s
overall structure as a modest program designed to have an
acceptably limited impact on the budget constrained federal
government as well as the applicable rental markets.158 The RSP
is thus designed to work within the existing governmental and
market parameters. The ten-year limitation thus increases the
likelihood that an RSP type program will be adopted. The
interest in rental housing demonstrated by the Obama
Administration provides hope that the RSP will receive a
sympathetic consideration in Washington.159
The RSP’s ten-year limit on rent protection reveals another
important point about what the RSP aims to achieve and what it
doesn’t. The RSP is not aimed at creating affordable housing
and should not be judged on such grounds. Why not? Because,
the RSP, and rent regulation generally, are not the proper tools
for creating or maintaining affordable housing for the long term.
While this is contrary to the arguments of some tenant advocates
and scholars,160 rent regulation regimes (including the RSP) are
Reduction, 4 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 30 (2009).
156
See id. at 46.
157
The ten year limitation would help assuage the conservative critiques
of government funded subsidy programs which are of an infinite duration.
See, e.g., the critiques coming from Ronald Utt of the Heritage Foundation,
objecting to Public Housing and Section 8 benefits as creating “a culture of
dependency that doesn’t encourage families to work or to improve their lot in
life.” Benson, supra note 2, at 4.
158
The importance of the ten year limitation to RSP’s limited impact on
markets is discussed more below.
159
See Joseph Williams, President Shifts Focus to Renting, Not Owning,
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 16, 2009 (detailing Administration’s plans to use
stimulus funds to create more rental housing affordable to low and moderate
income households).
160
See Chester Hartman, Evictions: The Hidden Housing Problem, 14
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too blunt to achieve the narrow tailoring that the most effective
affordable housing programs demand.161 For example, empirical
studies of New York City’s rent regulation have found that
households with higher incomes are more likely to live in rent
regulated housing as compared with low income households.162
The fact that wealthy households benefit from rent regulation in
addition to, or even more often than, poor households, does not
necessarily mean that that rent regulation should be
discontinued. Rather, it means that proponents of rent regulation
(and the RSP) must be able to identify important goals served by
such programs other than income redistribution.163 In this case,
the RSP serves the crucial goal of increasing tenant stability.164
The RSP is favorable to usual rent regulation schemes because it
has a more limited effect on the overall rental market and
because it features a federally funded rental subsidy which is
restricted to low to moderate income households.
While the RSP is not an affordable housing program, I
strongly support increased funding of the Section 8 Voucher
Program and other programs which enable low to moderate
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 461, 463 (2003).
161
See Edgar Olsen, Is Rent Control Good Social Policy?, 67 CHI. KENT
L. REV. 931, 938–40 (1991) (detailing studies showing that benefits of rent
regulation accumulate differently to different classes of people, and
concluding that due to such random effects, rent regulation “has no merit as a
redistributive device”).
162
See Ellen & O’Flaherty, supra note 52, at 9; see also Barros, supra
note 62, at 288.
163
Ellen & O’Flaherty, supra note 52, at 28 (identifying income
redistribution as one of the usual reasons for housing policy).
164
This is the view of Marvin Markus, chair of the Rent Guidelines
Board of New York City, who recently stated that New York City’s Rent
Stabilization regime is important as a “guarantee of tenure system . . . its
basic premise is not affordability. It is to protect the tenant in occupancy
from illegal and large-scale gouging.” See Eliot Brown, Rent Board Chief
Marvin Markus Pleads for ‘Rationality’, N.Y. OBSERVER, May 18, 2009,
available
at
http://www.observer.com/2009/real-estate/rent-board-chiefmarvin-markus-pleads-rationality; see also Greg Smithsimon, Rent
Regulation: The Right Tool for the Right Job, PLANETIZEN, May 14, 2007,
http:// planetizen.com/node/24451 (suggesting that rent regulation’s purpose
is to provide housing stability not affordable housing).
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income households obtain decent housing at rents they can
afford.165 Recent budget proposals and public statements by HUD
Secretary Donovan indicate that more resources for rental
housing are forthcoming.166 Increasing the strength of programs
like the Section 8 Voucher Program is the ultimate answer for
those households that are forced to move from the RSP-covered
housing after the ten years and are unable to afford market
rentals in acceptable areas.
2. Secondary Goal
Now I move to an evaluation of how the RSP serves my
secondary goal, which is avoiding excessive distortions in rental
housing markets and thereby maintaining market-based
incentives for landlords. The formulation of this goal is partially
based on sensible critiques of rent regulation.167 More
165

See generally Ed Koch & Robert Weiner, Renters Across America
Need More Help from Congress, DAILY NEWS (New York City), July 5,
2009, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/opinions/2009/07/05/200907-05_renters_across_america_need_more_help_from_congress.html
#ixzz0KTdnOBHC&C.
166
See, e.g., Eugene Gilligan, 90-Degree Turn: Stimulus Package
Redirects Housing Efforts to Affordable Rentals, MULTI-HOUSING NEWS,
Apr. 14, 2009 (describing how $13 billion in stimulus money is going to
HUD’s budget, including $2.3 billion in the Tax Credit Assistance Program
which will go to fill gaps in budgets for low income rental construction and
rehabilitation projects); Sule Aygoren Carranza, Experts Look at Housing
Under Obama Administration, GLOBEST.COM, Jan. 26, 2009, at 3,
http://www.globest.com/news/1332_1332/insider/176529-1.html (discussing
inclusion in stimulus bill of substantial resources to address multifamily rental
housing); Secretary Shaun Donovan, 2009–10 Housing and Urban
Development Budget (May 7, 2009) (stating that for too long there has been a
federal homeownership policy at expense of a federal policy aimed at
affordable rentals and detailing an increase in federal money for rental
program, including increased Section 8 voucher funding).
167
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of
Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 741 (1988). Epstein’s piece was the
seminal article which drew 7 response papers, all printed in a volume of the
Brooklyn Law Review. See id at 1215–80; see also William Tucker, How
Rent Control Drives Out Affordable Housing, Cato Institute Policy Analysis
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specifically, the consequences I seek to avoid or at least
minimize with the RSP include the following: (i) disincentivizing
the creation and maintenance of rental housing;168 (ii) creating

No. 274 (May 21, 1997), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa274.html (stating that cities that do not use rent control policies are
“rewarded with a normal competitive housing market in which housing is
available at every price level but [t]hose cities that succumb to the disease of
rent control are doomed to never-ending, house-to-house warfare over an
ever-diminishing supply of unaffordable housing”); Michael H. Schill,
Comment on Chester Hartman and David Robinson’s Evictions: The Hidden
Housing Problem, Protection or Protraction?, 14 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE
503, 513 (2003) (to properly address society housing problems, reforms must
work with the market system, and not it against it); c.f. Andrea B. Carroll,
The International Trend Toward Requiring Good Cause for Tenant Eviction:
Dangerous Portents for the United States, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 427, 446
n.139 (2008) (making the case against adopting good cause requirements for
eviction, which are often but not always accompanied by rent regulation). But
see Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHILOSOPHY &
PUBLIC AFFAIRS 350, 365 (Autumn 1986) (“A tenancy, no less than a singlefamily house, is the sort of property interest in which a person becomes selfinvested; and after the self-investment has taken place, retention of the
interest becomes a priority claim over curtailment of merely fungible interests
of others.”). But see Michael J. Mandel, Does Rent Control Hurt Tenants?:
A Reply to Epstein, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1267, 1273–74) (“It seems clear that
rent control is not a perverse public policy which hurts everyone. There are
winners and there are losers, and it is important to identify who is who. On
the landlord side the losers are people who owned rental housing at the time
the original rent control law was passed, and the winners are builders of new
apartments . . . . On the tenant side, the elderly and long-term stable
households benefit from the low levels of their original rent. People just
entering the rental market and renters who move frequently tend to pay
higher rents . . . or face long housing searches. Often this means that lowincome households do not receive as much protection from rent regulation.”);
Alyssa Katz, OUR LOT: HOW REAL ESTATE CAME TO OWN US 189 (2009)
(“[I]t’s impossible to make a blanket case for or against rent control . . . the
success or failure depends on gathering good information, exercising the
political will to calibrate the annoying details of administration and taking
leadership to reconcile conflict.”); Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement
of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 744 (2009) (property
decisions involve “plural values” and cannot be “adequately understood or
analyzed through a single metric”).
168
See Epstein, supra note 167, at 763–67 (criticizing rent control
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rules that are difficult for governments to administer or for
owners and tenants to understand and comply with;169
(iii) creating opportunities for abuse, or for shadow rental
markets to emerge; and (iv) incentivizing landlords and tenants
to dispute and litigate.170
regimes for, among other reasons, creating disincentives for housing
production and maintenance); see also Tucker, supra note 167, at 162.
However, the empirical case regarding the effects of rent regulation on new
construction and housing maintenance are disputed. See Ellen & O’Flaherty,
supra note 49, at 24 (citing various studies and concluding that “models that
forecast the effects of rent control and rental subsidies on the costs
of . . . uncontrolled rental housing . . . are extremely complex and do not
give unambiguous answers”); J. Gilderbloom & R. Appelbaum, RETHINKING
RENTAL HOUSING 57–67 (1988) (citing numerous studies of landlord behavior
and rental housing markets and finding a minimal effect of rent regulation on
levels of new construction and maintenance of existing housing); Kenneth K.
Baar, Would the Abolition of Rent Controls Restore A Free Market, 54
BROOK. L. REV. 1231, 1232–33 (1989) (citing numerous studies from the
1970s and 1980s, including many commissioned by governments, and
concluding that the reports that included data “on new apartment construction
in rent controlled jurisdictions have been mixed in their conclusions”); Olsen,
supra note 163, at 942–43 (“[T]he effect of rent control on the maintenance
of the controlled [housing] stock is ambiguous on theoretical
grounds . . . [and] the empirical literature contains no compelling
evidence.”); Collins, supra note 133, at 22 (finding that “New York [City’s]
two great housing booms . . . occurred during periods when strict rent
controls were imposed on existing units”); see also Peter D. Salins,
Reflections on Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54
BROOK. L. REV. 775, 779 (1988) (opponents of rent regulation who make
this argument [as to inefficiency] have also relied too heavily on theory, and
too little on empirical proof); see also id. at 780 (“[N[o one has yet
discovered the research design that will succeed in definitively making the
deregulation case.”).
169
For an example of a well intentioned scheme that may be
administratively difficult see Megan J. Ballard, Legal Protections for Home
Dwellers: Caulking the Cracks to Preserve Occupancy, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV.
277, 307 (2006) (suggesting that, when considering an eviction, a decision
maker evaluate various prescribed factors to assess the degree to which a
subsidized tenant considers a dwelling to be a home and if so indicated, “the
burden should shift to the opposing stakeholder to justify the basis for
eviction”).
170
See Michael J. Mandel, Does Rent Control Hurt Tenants? A Reply to
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For this secondary goal, avoiding the above-described
unintended consequences, the RSP serves its purpose well, albeit
not perfectly. Generally, the RSP seeks to combine the best
aspects of existing rent regulation systems and rental subsidy
programs, with certain additions suggested by the commercial
leasing framework, specifically longer lease options with
periodic step up rent increases. Specifically, the RSP would
avoid unintended consequences by creating a stock of rental
units priced at or near market rents. Units would be priced at or
near market because under the RSP landlords could take market
increases, at a minimum, every ten years, as well as annual
increases to cover increased costs in maintaining and improving
their buildings. The protection for tenants is from market
increases during their tenancy, up to their fourth lease renewal
or ten years. By making the rent regulation time limited and
subjecting all units in a jurisdiction to its purview, the RSP

Epstein, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1267, 1271 (1989) (“I agree with Epstein that
rent control leads to increased litigation between landlords and tenants. In
fact, the primary negative effect of rent regulation, from the viewpoint of
landlords, seems to be that it enmeshes them in a bureaucracy designed to
regulate housing prices, housing quality, and landlord-tenant relations.”).
Other critiques of rent control include the following: (i) it leads to the
misallocation of space (see Edward L. Glaeser & Erzo F.P. Luttmer, The
Misallocation of Housing Under Rent Control (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 6220, October 1997); Richard A. Epstein,
Rent Control Revisited: One Reply to Seven Critics, 54 BROOK. L. REV.
1281, 1289-90 (1988); (ii) that it is arbitrary, (iii) difficult to remove once
enacted and introduces politics into housing markets; and (iv) that it is a poor
toll for redistributing wealth. My response to these potential critiques of RSP
is as follows: (i) I agree that households which change in size during the ten
year maximum of rent regulation will have incentives to keep the unit and not
move to the appropriate sized unit, but given the important goals served by
RSP and the time limitation of this incentive, I am not terribly concerned;
(ii) RSP, by incorporating an income restricted rental subsidy, attempts to
address this arbitrariness; (iii) while it is important to consider the political
economy of rent regulation systems, as Epstein reminds us, like (i) above, in
light of the important goals furthered by RSP, ultimately this should not stop
any jurisdiction from adopting such a regime; (iv) I agree but as described
above, RSP is not aimed at wealth distribution but rather household and
neighborhood stability.
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would eliminate much of the difference in rents charged to
existing and new tenants. This is an important and positive
change to most existing rent regulation schemes, since it reduces
the current incentives for landlords to harass tenants into
leaving. The decreased harassment would likely reduce the
amount of landlord-tenant litigation, which in turn would reduce
the state’s administrative burden. Similarly, the ten-year limit on
rent regulation would greatly reduce the benefit of passing the
housing unit to a relative, and therefore the battles over
succession rights would be reduced. In addition, in another
positive change for landlord tenant relations, the RSP’s rent
subsidy for income and rent-burdened households would come at
the expense of the federal government and not landlords.
Finally, as an ancillary benefit, the federal funds for the RSP
rental subsidies would take one step towards achieving a more
balanced allocation of federal benefits allocated to renters and
owners.
D. RSP: Addressing Critiques & Concerns
The most basic question is why the RSP is needed. If it were
true, as Richard Epstein asserted in 1989, that those seeking
increased residential stability could simply purchase homes
instead of renting,171 then this would be a short paper indeed.
However, Epstein made this assertion prior to the foreclosure
crisis, and I am not sure that he would repeat the statement
today.172 It is evident from my arguments thus far that there are

171

See Epstein, supra note 167, at 1293 (“So long as the market is well
functioning, then persons who desire to have long-term attachments to
property can buy instead of rent.”).
172
However, Epstein has stated that much of the expense of housing
results from unneeded and unconstitutional government interference in the
housing market through building codes and zoning restrictions. See Epstein,
supra note 9, at 1287. It is possible that Epstein would argue that, free of
such constraints, the market would produce housing at all price points. While
such an assertion has a certain ideological appeal for Epstein, it would mean
that government would allow housing to be of questionable quality and
standard. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 37 (“It is not certain that the

CHASE REVISED.DOC

4/27/2010 7:32 PM

RETHINKING THE HOMEOWNERSHIP SOCIETY

109

a certain percentage of households that simply do not have the
economic ability to be homeowners, no matter their desire for
stability.173
The more nuanced question is why renters who desire
increased stability do not negotiate for longer lease terms. There
is some disagreement among wise minds on this question.
Robert Ellickson asserts that landlords cannot find tenants to
take the longer leases,174 while Professors Fennell & Roin posit
that landlords are fearful of such arrangements since tenants
have significantly less at stake to hold them to the lease terms,
specifically just a security deposit, while landlords are compelled
to comply by the tenants’ presence and the availability of court
protection.175 Neither Ellickson nor Fennell & Roin cite
empirical findings to support their respective propositions but I
am inclined to join Fennell & Roin on this point, especially with
respect to tenants at the lower-end of the economic spectrum. As
removal of such [building code] restrictions would make housing affordable
to the lowest income households . . . society may not accept the changes in
building and community standards that would be necessary if housing costs
were to be reduced to such levels.”). The regulation of single room
occupancy or “flophouse” hotels in New York City and San Francisco in the
1970s is one example of the tensions governments must weigh between trying
to improving housing conditions and eliminating the market altogether. See
Supportive Housing Network of NY, What is Supportive Housing? available
at http://www.shnny.org/what_is_history.html (“SRO hotels in New York
City were particularly vulnerable to conversion or demolition because of a
city tax abatement program . . . [which] created incentives for converting
SRO units into market-rate apartments, commercial hotels, or offices. Federal
urban renewal programs like Title I also led to the condemnation and
demolition of the SRO stock, particularly in midtown Manhattan.”).
173
See supra Part IV.B.
174
See Robert C. Ellickson, Rent Control: A Comment on Olsen, 67
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 947, 951 (1991) (“A residential tenant could also stave
off the risk of a rent increase by negotiating a long-term lease; in practice,
however, residential landlords, not tenants, typically push to lengthen
leases.”).
175
See Lee Ann Fennell & Julie Roin, Controlling Residential Stakes 15
(Univ. of Chicago Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper
No. 477, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1452887 [hereinafter Fennell & Roin, Controlling].
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demonstrated in Section IV, because of the disparities in supply
and demand, low-income tenants have little leverage for decent
units priced at rents they can afford. Therefore, I suspect that
the landlords are dictating the lease terms in such cases. This
strongly implies that landlords are reluctant to enter into longerterm leases, since 97% of the leases in non-regulated markets
are for less than a year.176
RSP would also face critiques from scholars, like Ellickson
who have questioned the need for rent protection to increase
rental stability. Ellickson states, “[r]ather than opportunistically
exploiting tenants who have put down roots, landlords instead
seem to give them price breaks.”177 While it makes sense for
landlords to give some price break to long-term tenants who are
proven reliable, public policy cannot rely on such whimsical and
haphazard protection for a matter as dire as rental stability.
Indeed, if we could rely on landlords to maintain reasonable
rents for long-term tenants, landlords would not object to current
“moderate” rent regulation statutes, which allow for periodic
rental increases.178 If Ellickson’s statement were the full story,
176

See Genesove, supra note 124, at 123. It does seem reasonable that
some rental households are reluctant to sign long term leases, which require
them to pay for the unit without any “out” clause for changed economic or
personal circumstances. This assumed reluctance on the part of tenants might
be somewhat addressed by having the rental subsidy proposed by RSP for
income challenged tenants, as well as having reasonable rights to assign
and/or sublease the unit. For RSP, I would incorporate the New York State
Real Property Law Section 226-b. This law provides that a residential tenant
may not assign his/her lease without the written consent of the owner, unless
the lease expressly provides otherwise. It also provides that a tenant has the
right to sublet his/her apartment, even if subletting is prohibited in the lease,
provided that the tenant complies strictly with the provisions of the statute,
which requires detailed notice to owner. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b
(2006).
177
See Ellickson, supra note 174, at 951 (“Contrary to their unsavory
reputations, residential landlords are not apt to jack up the real rents charged
sitting tenants. Olsen cites five studies that indicate that longtime tenants tend
to pay lower rents than do more recently arrived tenants who move into
comparable housing units.”).
178
See Mandel, supra note 165, at 1269–70 (distinguishing “strict” rent
control systems “which do not allow pass-throughs of rising operating costs,
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rent regulation would simply enforce what landlords would be
doing anyway. The vehemence of the landlord’s objection to
rent regulation disproves this potential objection to the RSP.
Landlords subject to rent regulations that currently exempt
new units from regulation179 would, at least initially, object to
the RSP requirement of having rents on new units regulated.
However, this is a crucial feature of the RSP since it would
result in substantially one class of tenants and owners,
eliminating the two tiered or “shadow markets” phenomenon
occurring under rent stabilization that Epstein and others
decry.180 More nuanced critics and landlords will focus not on
the fact of regulation, but the nature of regulation. Under the
RSP all units must be registered and the initial rents will be set
by the market. Similarly, at year ten, or when the tenant vacates
or initiates his or her fourth lease renewal, the landlord would
be able to take a market increase. In between day one and year
ten (at the latest), landlords could take increases for increased
costs and repairs. While far from the unregulated market
preferred by Epstein and the landlord lobby, the RSP does not
impose unreasonable controls.

[resulting in landlords finding that] it may become unprofitable to maintain or
even keep the building, which leads to abandonment” and “moderate” rent
control, which “allow[s] regulated rents to rise with inflation and increased
operating costs” noting that moderate rent control laws are much more
common than strict rent control and not bad policy); see also GILDERBLOOM
& APPELBAUM, supra note 168, at 128–132 (distinguishing “strict” rent
control which sets price limits without guaranteeing any right of return from
moderate rent control, as defined by Mandel, and “strong” rent control,
which was in effect in the 1980s in Santa Monica, Berkley and West
Hollywood, which allow increases lower than the Consumer Price Index and
no vacancy decontrol).
179
Most current regulation programs exempt new construction from
regulation. This includes the programs in New York City, as well as all of
the California jurisdictions which have rent regulation. See Katz, supra note
5, at 192.
180
See Epstein, Rent Control Revisited, supra note 170, at 1287 (“[I]t is
not possible to run a well-functioning two-tiered market, with some
deregulated and some regulated units.”); see also Tucker, supra note 167, at
3–4 (discussing shadow markets).
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This leads us to consider another likely critique from
landlords in jurisdictions with no rent regulation or good cause
eviction laws. Such landlords could object to the interference of
government in their market. However, the RSP rests on solid
legal and programmatic precedent.181 Operating residential rental
housing in urban areas is a highly regulated enterprise, whether
or not rent regulation applies. Governments must be finely
attuned to the external effects of land uses, given the high levels
of density in urban areas.182 Therefore, owners of such
properties are familiar with government regulation in a number
of contexts.183 Almost all owners are subject to building code
regulations and most are subject to zoning constraints as to the
type of building and size of buildings that are allowed.184 In
addition, several states and many localities restrict owners’
rights to evict only for prescribed “good cause.”185 Finally,
many states and localities restrict owners’ ability to convert units
to condominium or cooperative status.186
Finally, there is no doubt that the RSP will come with
administrative costs. My proposal suggests that, in order to
ensure consistent statewide application, each state designate an
agency as the regulatory authority for each of the localities that
181

See Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (upholding Washington
D.C. rent regulation scheme from constitutional attack); Pennell v. City of
San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) (following Block v. Hirsch); Rent Stabilization
Ass’n v. Higgins, 83 N.Y.2d 156 (1993) (citing Block v. Hirsch as good
law).
182
See Ellen & O’Flaherty, supra note 52, at 31 (noting that localities
might be more likely to try to promote residential stability through regulation
in dense “residential environments [where t]he development of trust and
social capital among neighbors seems more critical”).
183
See Apgar 2004, supra note 5, at 10 (“[T]enant/landlord laws and
regulations govern the obligation of the property owner to meet certain
standards of service provision and process concerning . . . eviction . . . .
[Also] zoning, building and health codes along with other land use regulations
impose responsibilities on owners . . . or otherwise place limitations on the
use of an owner occupied property.”).
184
See Baar, supra note 168, at 1234–35.
185
See Roisman, supra note 73, at 834–35.
186
See 15A AM. JUR. 2D Condominiums § 16.
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adopt the RSP. Said state agency would also supervise the RGB
that sets annual cost based increases. The exact costs to state
government in administering the RSP would depend on a variety
of factors, including the number and population size of the
localities which adopt the RSP, the number of complaints and
disputes to be adjudicated and other factors. It is likely that there
would be a fairly significant amount of resources needed at the
commencement of the RSP; from then on a professional staff at
the agency would likely suffice. Localities could consider
funding the RSP through user fees assessed against landlords
and/or tenants, or through general purpose tax revenues.
When calculating whether to adopt the RSP, sophisticated
states and localities would focus on the potential benefits in
addition to the administrative costs. The benefits of the RSP
would be increased stability for tenant households and the
accompanying spillover benefits to the surrounding communities.
These include an increase in citizen participation in the
community, better maintenance of their houses, and lower rates
of neighborhood crime.187
In conclusion, the goals served by the RSP—increasing
tenant and neighborhood stability—outweigh the costs and
potential inefficiencies of the program.
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO THE RSP
Happily, I am far from alone in concluding that the current
state of housing policy needs substantial revision to assist rental
and owner households. Below are three examples of innovative
new approaches to housing policy formed in response to the
current crisis. While all three offer some improvement over the
current system, I argue that they all fall short of the RSP in
terms of alleviating housing instability.
A. Rental Insurance
Robert Lerman & Aigne-Mary McKernan have promoted the
187

See supra Section II.C.
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development of a financial risk or hedge product, which would
enable renters to buy protection against future rent increases,
based on some composite index of rents in the applicable
neighborhood or market.188 Their approach builds on the work of
Robert Shiller, who assisted in developing markets which enable
homeowners and other traders to purchase and sell insurance
tied to reductions in area house prices.189 Lerman & McKernan
seek to extend such a concept to renters.
The authors argue that such an approach is preferable to rent
regulations or rent subsidies. They cite the usual arguments
against rent regulations, namely that such regulation reduces
property owners’ incentives to maintain property and to invest in
added housing thereby “inducing shortages and higher prices for
uncontrolled units.” As to rent subsidies, the authors object to
the fact that subsidies in gentrifying neighborhoods will exceed
those in lower income areas. They argue that their approach
“improves on rent control and some subsidy approaches by
divorcing the compensation (for area rent increases) from the
renter’s subsequent choice of locations.”190
The idea proposed by Lerman & McKernan has a number of
elegant features. Most notably, after the market for such rental
insurance is created and perfected, government’s role can be
relatively minor. Indeed, regulating the market for such a
product should be much less involved than the administrative
role under the RSP in setting rent increases, monitoring
compliance and settling disputes. Furthermore, it creates no
incentives for conflict between landlords and tenants.
For all its theoretical advantages, however, the proposed
rental insurance product raises a number of unanswered
questions and concerns. First, who would pay for such a product
188

See Robert I. Lerman & Signe-Mary McKernan, Promoting
Neighborhood Improvement while Protecting Low Income Families, 8 URBAN
INST., May 2007, available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311457_
Promoting_Neighborhood.pdf.
189
See Robert Schiller, Mortgages of the Future, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21,
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/business/21view.
html.
190
See Lerman & McKernan, supra note 188, at 2.
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for low and moderate-income households?191 Second, the
complexity of the product proposed is worrisome.192 The product
seems difficult to create: it requires an extremely accurate
measure of rents down to a fairly granular level—zip code. It is
questionable whether reliable data for this index currently exists.
Even more problematic, the complexity of the product seems to
limit its usefulness for the intended beneficiaries, at least those
without a high degree of financial sophistication. As we have
seen from the subprime mortgage example, devising complex
financial products for low to moderate-income households
regarding their housing situation is fraught with risk. In this
case, the success of the insurance product depends on renters
choosing the right amount of coverage—not an easy task.
Perhaps these concerns can be addressed. For now, it
suffices to say that the RSP is a more viable program. No new
markets or inventions are needed and the households that are the
intended beneficiaries will be protected by a legal system that is
administered by a government agency specifically charged with
its enforcement.
B. Requiring Good Cause For Eviction
In her recent article,193 Florence Roisman identifies the lack
of restriction on landlords’ abilities to evict or fail to renew
leases as the primary problem for tenants. She advocates for
courts, through common law contract doctrines, to enact a
requirement that landlords have good cause before evictions. She
notes that protected tenancies should not be restricted to those
194
who can “negotiate long-term leases” but to all.
Roisman clearly shares my goals of providing additional
stability for rental households, however, she does not address

191

See Fennell & Roin, Controlling, supra note 175, at 19.
See id. at 19-22 (attempting to develop the proposal that Lerman &
McKernan sketched out, acknowledging a number of unanswered questions
and logistical difficulties).
193
Roisman, supra note 73.
194
Id. at 829.
192
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whether or how tenants would be shielded from eviction
resulting from an inability to pay for rent increases. The RSP
incorporates Roisman’s central point by requiring as an essential
component that landlords have good cause to evict or fail to
renew a lease. The RSP goes further by addressing the economic
side of the equation: specifically the RSP offers all tenants a
certain degree of rental protection for ten years, and to those
who are low- to moderate-income and rent burdened, a subsidy
to cover the allowable increases.195
C. New Models of Homeownership
Lee Ann Fennell of the University of Chicago Law School
has offered one of the most creative proposals aimed at
reforming the current model of homeownership, called
Homeownership 2 or H2.0.196 H2.0 is designed to enable
aspiring homebuyers to purchase a home but limit the extent of
their investment (and risk of loss) to factors within the
homeowner’s control. Specifically, H2.0 seeks to allocate to
homeowners the profit and loss properly tied to the condition
195

There are of course other rental models that could be considered. One
interesting example is that of Sweden, described in detail in One Nation’s
Dream, Another’s Realty: Housing Justice In Sweden, 22 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
63, 94–96 (1996). In Sweden, the government plays a much more significant
role in the rental market than in the U.S., significantly more than even those
jurisdictions under rent control. Construction and operation of most rental
housing in Sweden is financed by the government and therefore the rent
setting process and admissions process is heavily controlled by the
government as well. Among other aspects, Swedish tenants are protected
from eviction by good cause requirements and prospective tenants obtain
newer apartments by waiting list. Furthermore, “[r]ents are determined on an
annual basis pursuant to negotiations between the municipal housing
corporations and tenants’ associations.” Id. at 94–95. Kenn finds much to
admire in the Swedish model, but the amount of subsidies and degree of
governmental involvement required do not make it a good fit for the current
political and economic system in the United States. See also Roisman, supra
note 73, at 856 (“The provision of decent, affordable housing for poor people
is not an area for private enterprise. It is a government
responsibility . . . .”).
196
See Fennell, supra note 8.
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and improvements made to the house and site-specific factors
they can control. The risk and reward attributable to local offsite factors (schools, crime rates, neighborhood amenities) as
well as broader economic risks (real estate prices, economic
cycles) would be purchased by a market of investors.197 Thus,
Fennell envisions a new option for homebuyers—the right to
purchase a home and keep the equity based on payments made
and improvements to the house and site but to avoid the broader
economic investment that is currently required.198
Fennell’s proposal has a great deal of promise. I believe that
she accurately posits that a significant percentage of prospective
homebuyers would be interested in exchanging some of the
potential upside of their home investment for a product that
limits the potential downside as well. This is especially likely in
turbulent real estate market cycles such as the current one.
Indeed, if it could be perfected, H2.0 could be the kind of tool
that gets prospective buyers “off the sideline” as has been the
common refrain among real estate professionals and many
197

See id. at 1072.
As Fennell discusses, H2.0 is a variation on a more traditional shared
equity or shared appreciation type of homeownership program. See id. In
such a program, a public or private entity contributes part of the upfront cost
of purchasing a home. In exchange, such investor entity shares in any future
house appreciation. Public investors, usually municipal governments, use
such appreciation to enable low to moderate income households to purchase
the house when it is put up for re-sale. See id. at 1064–66. In Australia, a
privately created product called the Equity Finance Mortgage uses future
house appreciation to replace monthly payments on a second position loan
that is made to enable the household to afford the downpayment. See Equity
Finance Mortgage, http://www.efm.info/pdf/EFMBrochureV3.pdf (last
visited Sept. 30, 2009). When the household sells the property or refinances,
it must repay the principal balance of the second loan plus up to a 40% share
of any increase in the value of the property. See id. Other intriguing
proposals to revise the current model of homeownership include Robert
Schiller’s idea of the continually adjusting mortgage. This mortgage product,
to be offered by banks, would reduce defaults by automatically adjusting
payments due each month according to fluctuations in the economic and real
estate markets. See Robert Schiller, Mortgages of the Future, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept.
21,
2008,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/09/21/business/21view.html.
198

CHASE REVISED.DOC

4/27/2010 7:32 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

118

economists in recent months. H2.0 has the additional promise of
maintaining the economic incentives for homeowners to improve
their property as well as the local conditions under their control.
This adds a layer of sophistication to her proposal.
However, H2.0 does not seek to address the crisis
experienced by millions of households who are seeking more
affordable and stable rental options.199 Indeed, by excluding
rental housing from its purview, I fear that H2.0 continues the
emphasis on homeownership as the Holy Grail for both
household satisfaction and economic recovery. To achieve the
balance between homeownership and rental programs, I would
urge adoption of the RSP or other rental programs as a
complement to H2.0.
CONCLUSION
Our current polices of prioritizing homeownership to the
exclusion of the needs of rental households have failed. We as a
society need to stop over subsidizing and promoting
homeownership as the only model for successful American
households. Changes to policy are particularly urgent now as
millions of Americans have been forced from homeownership
into rental housing as a result of the foreclosure crisis and the
economic recession.
The RSP offers one step towards reclaiming an equilibrium
in government preferences between homeownership and renting.
By enabling households to achieve stability while renting, the
RSP provides benefits for those households and also their
neighbors and larger communities. While the specific contours
of the RSP are subject to further conversation, this paper makes
199

Fennell and her colleague Julie Roin, propose revising the incentives
for both renters and homeowners. They seek to right size the incentives of
both understaked households, renters and homeowners with no or negative
equity, and “overstaked” homeowners who oppose sensible zoning ordinances
and other neighborhood changes. See generally Fennell & Roin, Controlling,
supra note 175. The authors urge that local governments have an important
stake in such “right staking” and, subject to state constitutional constraints,
engage in such efforts.
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clear that the conversation regarding our national housing policy
needs to be amended to include the needs of renters.

